What's the remediation path for cbETH suppliers who were never liquidated but still can't withdraw?

Proposals
1

Hi all,

I want to raise a case that seems distinct from the borrower remediation discussed in the Reserve Recommendations threads, and I don’t think it’s been addressed directly yet.

My situation:
I’m a cbETH supplier on the Base Core Market. I was never liquidated — I have no borrow position, no collateral seized, nothing tied to the Feb 15 oracle incident on my account directly. I simply supplied cbETH and I am currently unable to withdraw it (currently “Available to Withdraw” shows ~0.0000000001 cbETH against a 1.05 cbETH position).

Why this seems separate from the current remediation plans:
From what I can tell from the reserve reports (5/28, 6/25, 7/22), the cbETH market currently has ~674 cbETH of gross bad debt against a total supplied of ~686 cbETH, with reserves covering only ~0.33% of that gap. The existing remediation framework (repayBorrowBehalf using reserves, the cbETH incident dashboard) is explicitly scoped to borrowers whose collateral was seized during the Feb 14-18 liquidation window. Suppliers like me who were never liquidated don’t appear in that dashboard and don’t seem to be covered by any stated plan.

The core question:
Given that ~98% of the cbETH market is effectively unbacked bad debt, is there a plan — even a rough timeline or framework — for suppliers in this position to eventually recover their funds? Options I could imagine:

  • Suppliers being added to the same reserve-funded repayment cadence as the liquidated borrowers
  • A pro-rata haircut eventually applied to all cbETH suppliers, formalized rather than left as indefinite illiquidity
  • Some other mechanism I’m not aware of

I don’t think I’m the only supplier in this situation, and right now there’s no visibility into what happens to this segment of users.

Looking forward to hearing back from the team on this. Thanks in advance.

3 Likes
Monthly Governance Reports
2

I’m in the same situation. I lent my cbETH in June and then the liquidity is drained the day after. Moonwell had my trust that’s why I used it. Hope there’s remediation plan soon.

1 Like
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looks a huge % of user has tye same problem, i wander how are they going to give back out tokens . theres no discord to open a ticket and also they are not offering any solution when it comes to deprecated vaults, telegram is full of scammers , you just dont know who is the real admin

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I am in the same boat and wondering the same thing. We need a plan…

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There is a discord, and you can open a ticket

6

Same here, I lent some cbeth at the end of august without realizing this situation and it was withdrawn within 5 minutes, so now I’m stuck

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Same here i still have my CBETH and was NOT liquidated !

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Same situation. We need a plan to get the money back

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I’m in the same position juju describes, but in a different market — which I think matters for how this question gets framed.

I supply EURC in the Base Core Market. I was never liquidated and never borrowed against the position. The market currently shows roughly 337,793 EURC supplied against about 5 EURC of available liquidity — effectively 100% utilization. My withdrawable balance is capped at whatever few units happen to be free at the moment I check.

The relevant figures from Anthias Labs’ 8/24 reserve recommendation: EURC on Base carries $168,622.96 in bad debt against $831.92 in reserves. That is coverage of roughly 0.5%, comparable to the ~0.33% juju cites for cbETH. No repayment was proposed for EURC in that report.

I’d like to raise one specific question about MIP-X66, which is live now.

MIP-X66 withdraws approximately $245,738 in protocol-owned reserves across Base and OP Mainnet, converts them to USDC, and applies the proceeds to bad debt in the USDC market on behalf of a single address. That sum exceeds the entire EURC shortfall by roughly $77,000.

I’m not arguing the USDC recapitalization is wrong — I have no visibility into what makes that position systemically important, and there may be a good reason. But it does establish that the binding constraint on remediation is not always available capital. Sometimes it is prioritization. So the question I would ask is: what is the criterion? Is there an ordering — by market size, by systemic risk, by incident, by cost-to-close — that affected users could look at and locate themselves in? At present no queue is published, which means neither juju nor I can tell whether we are far down a list or not on one at all.

A second point on MIP-X66. It cuts the EURC jump multiplier from 9 to 1, materially reducing the interest accruing on bad debt. As balance-sheet hygiene that seems clearly correct — that accrual was never collectible and only inflated the shortfall. But it also slows the rate at which the EURC market accumulates reserves of its own, which is the mechanism by which a market this size might eventually close its own gap. If there is a modeled timeline for EURC reaching self-coverage under the new curve, publishing it would be useful. And if that timeline is effectively unbounded, that is itself the answer to whether an external source of funds is required.

To restate juju’s question in a form that covers both markets: is the remediation framework scoped to borrowers whose collateral was seized, by design and permanently? Or is a supplier-side path contemplated? The Apollo recovery plan and the monthly excess reserve distribution proposal are both borrower-scoped as written. If a supplier-side equivalent is under discussion, saying so — even without numbers or dates — would change what affected suppliers understand themselves to be waiting on.

At roughly $168k, EURC is the cheapest of the outstanding shortfalls to close. I’d suggest that makes it a reasonable place to establish the principle, if the principle is going to exist at all.