Proposal to add deSPXA market to Moonwell on Base

[graham_centrifuge]

Proposal: Add deSPXA Market to Moonwell on Base

Submitted by the Centrifuge Team

1. Summary

We are proposing the listing of deSPXA as a market on Moonwell on Base.

deSPXA is a freely transferable, Base-native debt instrument linked to SPXA, the Janus Henderson Anemoy S&P 500 Index Fund. SPXA is the first licensed, fully on-chain S&P 500 index fund token, issued under licence from S&P Dow Jones Indices and managed by Janus Henderson Investors and Anemoy Asset Management. The fund is structured as an open-ended BVI Professional Fund issued by Anemoy Capital SPC Limited and administered by Trident Trust.

deSPXA is issued as a freely transferable ERC-20 debt instrument linked to SPXA’s NAV, deployed on Base. It gives DeFi users 24/7 access to S&P 500 exposure that can be held, traded and used as collateral in any compatible protocol.

Listing deSPXA on Moonwell would give Base users a way to borrow against tokenised S&P 500 exposure, broadening Moonwell’s real-world-asset collateral set and adding a high-quality, deeply liquid asset class to the protocol.

2. Asset Overview

2.1 What deSPXA is

• deSPXA is a deRWA token: an ERC-20 debt instrument linked to the SPXA share class NAV.

• Unlike SPXA, deSPXA has no whitelist or transfer restrictions and can be held, traded and integrated into DeFi protocols freely.

• deSPXA is redeemable into USDC only by KYC’d participants. Retail holders interact with deSPXA via secondary markets (Aerodrome).

2.2 Underlying Fund (SPXA)

SPXA is the share class token of the Janus Henderson Anemoy S&P 500 Index Fund. The fund is a passively managed, fully replicated S&P 500 strategy, issued under licence from S&P Dow Jones Indices.

2.3 deSPXA token mechanics

• deSPXA is minted when a KYC’d participant invests USDC into deSPXA via the tokenized product.

• It is burned when a KYC’d participant redeems back into USDC.

• There are no transfer restrictions on deSPXA itself.

• deSPXA NAV is derived from the underlying SPXA fund, which is updated daily based on the previous day’s closing NAV.

3. Token Information

Field	Value
Token symbol	deSPXA
Network	Base
Token contract	0x9c5C365e764829876243d0b289733B9D2b729685
Decimals	18
Token standard	ERC-20 with deRWA freely-transferable hook
Underlying SPXA token (Base)	0x09b61343097c1f9b159a3ae7151298efd10f0db2
deSPXA pool ID (Centrifuge)	281474976710668
deSPXA USDC vault (Base)	0x2da40f061536c2f3a8f95f23a5f4c133d07d393a
Aerodrome liquidity pool	0xf840346fafedc1c0466216f3a899a599e6d03e75

4. Centrifuge Protocol Context

deSPXA is issued through Centrifuge V3, the protocol that underpins Janus Henderson Anemoy fund tokens (JTRSY, JAAA, SPXA) and their freely transferable deRWA counterparts (deJTRSY, deJAAA, deSPXA).

Architecture

• Pools and vaults are deployed as immutable contracts. Permission and configuration changes route through a 48-hour timelock.

• NAV updates are published to the Centrifuge Hub by the fund manager and propagated to spoke chains.

• Cross-chain messaging is currently powered by LayerZero (2/2 DVN required, soon to be 4/4) and Axelar.

Settlement on the underlying fund

• Subscriptions: USDC into the deSPXA, processed daily, T+1 settlement on the underlying fund.

• Redemptions: deSPXA into the deSPXA vault, processed daily, T+1 settlement.

• KYC’d partificants are responsible for managing primary market activity. Retail flow happens entirely on Aerodrome via deSPXA.

5. Market Thesis: Why deSPXA on Moonwell

• First fully on-chain, licensed S&P 500 index fund. There is no equivalent on Base today.

• 24/7 tradeable equity index exposure. ETFs trade ~6.5 hours a day; deSPXA trades whenever Base is producing blocks.

• Composable collateral. Moonwell users can post deSPXA, borrow USDC, and put the borrow to work elsewhere on Base without giving up S&P 500 exposure.

• Uncorrelated with the existing collateral set. Moonwell’s book is dominated by ETH-correlated assets and stablecoins; equity index exposure broadens the risk profile of the protocol.

• Strong cohort overlap. Centrifuge investors and Base DeFi users are largely the same audience; we expect immediate organic demand on listing.

6. Liquidity and Market Information

deSPXA is the canonical secondary-market token for S&P 500 exposure on Centrifuge V3. Liquidity is concentrated on Aerodrome on Base.

Metric	Value
Primary venue	Aerodrome (Base)
Aerodrome pool TVL	~$4M
$2.2M deSPXA → USDC swap slippage	~5%
Daily volume (30d avg)	~$500k

These numbers meet the Moonwell swap-size and liquidity thresholds outlined in the Asset Listing Framework V2: deSPXA can absorb a $2.2M sale into USDC at ~5% slippage on the primary venue, with a $4M TVL pool backing it. Liquidity will continue to scale alongside SPXA AUM and is supported by a dedicated market maker.

7. Smart Contracts and Audits

Token standards and design

• ERC-20: base fungible standard for deSPXA itself.

• ERC-7540: asynchronous vault standard used by the SPXA primary-market vault.

• deRWA hook: freely transferable token hook used to expose SPXA NAV via a debt-instrument token.

Upgradeability

• All core Centrifuge V3 contracts are immutable once deployed. There are no proxy patterns on the token, vault or hub layer.

• Permission changes are gated by a 48-hour timelock; emergency pause is multi-sig controlled by the Centrifuge Protocol Guardian.

Audits

The Centrifuge protocol has undergone 24+ external security reviews. The most recent reviews covering V3 / V3.1 (which include the deRWA hook used by deSPXA) include:

Auditor	Scope	Date
yAudit	Protocol V3.1	January 2026
Sherlock + Blackthorn (contest)	Protocol V3.1	Nov-Dec 2025
Cantina	Protocol V3.0 / V3.1	2025
Spearbit	Protocol V3.0	2024-2025
Code4rena	Protocol V1.0	September 2023

• No security exploits since launch in 2019.

• All audit reports are published in the Centrifuge protocol repository.

Repository: https://github.com/centrifuge/protocol

Audit reports: https://docs.centrifuge.io/developer/security/overview/

8. Oracle

TBD — pending Chronicle integration. We will update this section with the oracle address, update cadence, and any deviation/staleness parameters once the Chronicle feed for deSPXA is live and the integration with Moonwell is finalised.

11. Proposed Initial Market Parameters

We defer to Anthias Labs as Moonwell’s Risk Curator on Base for specific risk parameter recommendations. Anthias will respond on this thread with a Risk Analysis covering supply caps, borrow caps, collateral factor, liquidation parameters and reserve factor.

Our suggestion as the asset issuer is to start conservative and scale parameters with on-chain liquidity and observed utilisation, consistent with how other RWA listings have rolled out on Moonwell.

12. References

deSPXA announcement (X): https://x.com/centrifuge/status/2038605049346367850

Centrifuge blog (deSPXA on Base): https://centrifuge.io/blog/despxa-on-base

Anemoy SPXA fund page: https://www.anemoy.io/funds/spxa

Centrifuge pool (issuer): https://app.centrifuge.io/pool/281474976710668/base/usdc

deSPXA on BaseScan: https://basescan.org/token/0x9c5c365e764829876243d0b289733b9d2b729685

GeckoTerminal chart: https://www.geckoterminal.com/base/pools/0xf840346fafedc1c0466216f3a899a599e6d03e75

Aerodrome liquidity pool: https://aerodrome.finance/liquidity?query=deSPXA

Aerodrome swap: https://aerodrome.finance/swap?from=0x9c5c365e764829876243d0b289733b9d2b729685&to=0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913&chain0=8453&chain1=8453

Centrifuge documentation: https://docs.centrifuge.io

Centrifuge protocol GitHub: https://github.com/centrifuge/protocol

[AnthiasLabs]

Summary

Anthias Labs supports initializing a deSPXA market in Moonwell’s Core markets on Base, but does not recommend meaningful supply or borrow caps at this time due to insufficient DEX liquidity. We recommend launching the market with effectively zeroed-out supply and borrow caps. This allows the market to be deployed in advance while preserving the ability to raise caps quickly via Cap Guardian once sufficient, sticky on-chain DEX liquidity has been established.

In this post, we share our analysis and risk parameter recommendations.

Volatility

The Anemoy S&P 500 Index Fund (SPXA) tracks the S&P 500, which has historically been far less volatile than crypto assets such as BTC and ETH. Since its inception in 1990, the VIX, which measures the S&P 500’s 30-day annualized volatility, has never exceeded 90%, peaking at roughly 89% during the 2008 financial crisis and 85% during the 2020 COVID shock.

This suggests that SPXA’s underlying index exposure carries materially lower price volatility than most crypto-native collateral assets. Based on price volatility alone, deSPXA could potentially support a relatively high LTV given the stability of the underlying exposure under normal market conditions. However, price behavior is not the only factor when setting collateral factors. DEX liquidity is also critical, and deSPXA currently lacks sufficient on-chain liquidity to support high collateral factors safely.

Liquidity

DEX liquidity for deSPXA remains thin. On Aerodrome, where liquidity is concentrated, a 700 deSPXA swap, worth roughly $500K, would currently incur more than 25% slippage when swapped into USDC. Total liquidity on Aerodrome is also below $800K. Under the Asset Listing Framework, an asset should support a $500K swap with less than 25% slippage and maintain more than $2M in TVL. Based on current conditions, deSPXA does not meet these liquidity thresholds.

Oracle

We recommend using the deSPXA oracle provided by Chronicle Labs:

Oracle address: 0x97165Ad36D96567a521958cc46914160B968752b

This oracle is already used in production on Morpho in an isolated deSPXA/USDC market, which currently has supply from Steakhouse.

This oracle differs from the typical pricing approach used for more liquid on-chain assets. Standard oracles, such as Chainlink feeds, generally aggregate prices across multiple venues where an asset actively trades, including CEXs and DEXs. Because deSPXA is sparsely traded on-chain, a traditional market-price-based oracle would be more vulnerable to manipulation and less suitable for lending purposes.

Chronicle Labs has instead developed a custom pricing solution for deSPXA. The oracle uses the latest official daily S&P price as the base reference, then applies the intraday price delta derived from the Hyperliquid S&P 500 perpetual market, deployed by xyz, to produce a continuously updated proxy price for deSPXA.

The pricing logic is as follows:

1. Centrifuge submits an official daily S&P reference price.
2. That daily S&P price becomes the base reference.
3. The Hyperliquid S&P 500 perpetual market is used to measure the intraday price delta since the daily reference point.
4. The oracle adds the Hyperliquid-derived price delta to the daily S&P price.
5. The resulting value is used as the continuously updated proxy price for deSPXA.

In simplified terms:

deSPXA Proxy Price = Daily S&P Price + Price Delta Derived from Hyperliquid

The oracle updates every 30 minutes and includes a circuit breaker. Specifically, price movements are capped at 2.5% between updates, meaning any move beyond that threshold breaks the circuit. In addition, the underlying Hyperliquid perpetual market clamps mark price updates to 50 bps every 3 seconds, a constraint inherited by the oracle.

These controls make the oracle difficult to manipulate over short time horizons. For example, assuming a 70% collateral factor, an attacker would need to dislocate the oracle price by roughly 30% to overcome the collateral buffer. With a maximum 2.5% price movement every 30 minutes, this would require maintaining a manipulated price for more than six hours. In practice, the cost and complexity of sustaining such an attack would likely be prohibitively high.

Risk Parameters

Given the S&P’s low historical volatility, we believe a 70% collateral factor is conservative from a price-risk perspective. However, because current DEX liquidity is low, we recommend using effectively zero, but non-zero, supply and borrow caps until on-chain liquidity improves. (At the contract level, cap of zero = infinity).

Parameter	Recommended Value
Collateral Factor	70%
Reserve Factor	20%
Supply Cap	1 wei
Borrow Cap	1 wei

IR Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Base	0
Multiplier	0.0615
Kink	45%
Jump Multiplier	2

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 20%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
45% (kink)	2.77%	0.99%
100%	112.77%	90.21%

Next Steps

We support initializing a deSPXA market with effectively zeroed-out supply and borrow caps. These caps can then be raised quickly via Cap Guardian once DEX liquidity reaches suitable thresholds.

[Luke]

Thank you @graham_centrifuge for this proposal. I agree that the addition of the deSPXA market to Moonwell would enable long and short leverage against the S&P 500, which is a meaningful RWA use case for Base users.

My primary concern is the lack of onchain liquidity and holder concentration. The onchain market cap is ~$3.7M today, 5/5/2026, and the top 2 holders hold ~75% of the total supply. About ~10% of the total supply is in Aerodrome, which does provide good DEX liquidity, and the remaining ~15% are smaller holders. With only 257 total holders, deSPXA isn’t yet broadly distributed among thousands of accounts such as other markets like VVV (Venice) which was added recently.

@AnthiasLabs

However, because current DEX liquidity is low, we recommend using effectively zero, but non-zero, supply and borrow caps until on-chain liquidity improves. (At the contract level, cap of zero = infinity).

My other concern is commercial viability. With effectively 0 supply and borrow caps, the market is unlikely to generate meaningful revenue or fees for the Moonwell protocol or suppliers.

I think both of these issues can be resolved by increasing onchain liquidity, so I would encourage the Centrifuge team to work to increase onchain holder count, distribution, and liquidity, so that it can be a commercially viable market for Moonwell. Thanks again for your proposal.

[Chidi]

Thanks to @graham_centrifuge for the proposal, and to @Luke and @AnthiasLabs for the analysis already shared. deSPXA is worth evaluating as a strategic RWA addition to Moonwell, but would benefit from more clarity before this moves to a vote.

1. Liquidity

Current visible DEX liquidity appears to fall materially short of MALF thresholds. Public GeckoTerminal API data shows the primary Aerodrome deSPXA/USDC pool at roughly $757K in liquidity, and Anthias’s analysis notes that total Aerodrome liquidity is below $800K. That is well below the $2M MALF threshold and materially below the ~$4M figure cited in the proposal.

Anthias also notes that a 700 deSPXA swap, worth roughly $500K, would currently incur more than 25% slippage** when swapped into USDC. That appears to fall short of the MALF swap-size requirement as well.

24-hour volume is roughly at $169K in 24-hour volume for the primary pool, while the proposal cites a 30-day average daily volume of ~$500K.

Additional clarification would be helpful on the original liquidity and volume numbers, including whether there are additional liquidity sources, market-maker commitments, or aggregator routes that are not visible in public DEX data.

2. Deploying with 1 wei caps

Anthias’s recommendation to deploy with effectively zeroed supply and borrow caps is pragmatic. However, this should be treated clearly as a disabled or pre-positioned market, not as a normal MALF-passing launch.

Before caps are increased beyond the initial 1 wei levels, delegates would benefit from clarity on:

• what exact liquidity threshold triggers a cap increase;
• whether the trigger is the MALF $2M threshold or something else;
• whether Cap Guardian can raise caps alone or whether governance approval is required;
• whether holder concentration and oracle risk will be reviewed before caps increase;
• whether there will be a time-bound review if liquidity does not improve.

3. Reg S / U.S. access

The proposal says deSPXA has no whitelist or transfer restrictions. That may be true at the token level, but it is not the same as saying the offering is unrestricted.

Centrifuge’s own materials describe deSPXA as intended for non-U.S. users, and the disclaimer says deSPXA and related products are offered only outside the United States to non-U.S. persons under Regulation S.

The reason this matters is that deSPXA is not just a generic DeFi token. It is linked to SPXA, which gives exposure to the S&P 500. The S&P 500 is a U.S. equity index, so the underlying reference exposure is U.S. equities. That makes the access question more important: the token may be freely transferable onchain, but the related offering is described by Centrifuge as restricted to non-U.S. persons.

That creates a mismatch the thread has not fully addressed:

• the token is freely transferable;
• U.S. users may be able to hold, trade, supply, or borrow it onchain;
• the Moonwell front end may display the market without a deSPXA-specific geofence.

Before deployment, even with 1 wei caps, there should be confirmation that someone with legal expertise has reviewed whether the Moonwell front end needs any restriction for this market. There should also be clarity on which party is responsible for compliance: the issuer, the listing venue, or both.

[Jor-el]

Thanks to the Centrifuge team for the proposal and to Anthias for the analysis.

I’m broadly supportive of initializing a deSPXA market on Moonwell Core on Base. The thesis is sound: uncorrelated equity index exposure genuinely diversifies our collateral set away from ETH-correlated assets and stables, and the Centrifuge V3 architecture (immutable contracts, 48-hour timelock, no upgrade proxies) is materially safer than what most issuers ship. Aligned with Anthias on the effectively zeroed-out caps approach.

A few additional observations I want on the record before this moves forward:

1. The liquidity numbers in the proposal don’t match what’s actually live on-chain.

The proposal cites ~$4M Aerodrome TVL and ~5% slippage on a $2.2M deSPXA → USDC swap.

But this is different from what’s on-chain right now:

• The main USDC/deSPXA Concentrated 50 pool on Aerodrome has ~$765K TVL — not $4M.
• A 700 deSPXA swap (~$506K notional) currently quotes 28.79% price impact on Aerodrome, flagged HIGH RISK in the swap UI itself.
• Anthias’s read confirms total Aerodrome liquidity sits under $800K.

This is obviously not a rounding gap. The proposal claims the asset meets the Listing Framework V2 thresholds (>$2M TVL, $500K swap at <25% slippage) when it materially fails both. I’d ask the Centrifuge team to either reconcile this directly or update the proposal to reflect actual conditions, because the framing affects how the rest of the forum reads the listing.

2. Oracle architecture has unaddressed market-hours risk.

The Chronicle proxy oracle (daily S&P reference + Hyperliquid perp delta) is a clever solution for a sparsely traded asset and the manipulation math Anthias laid out is reasonable for short-horizon attacks. The piece that’s missing is what happens when reference markets close.

The S&P 500 cash market trades ~6.5 hours per day. The futures market has daily closures and the full weekend gap from Friday 5pm ET to Sunday 6pm ET. During those windows, deSPXA pricing leans entirely on the Hyperliquid perp; a single, comparatively thin venue.

The 2.5% per 30-min circuit breaker mitigates manipulation but doesn’t address the real risk: the Hyperliquid perp trades 24/7, but during weekends and overnight there’s no real underlying price discovery happening; just speculation on a thin venue.

If a material event occurs over the weekend (geopolitical shock, weekend escalation, surprise policy action abroad), the Hyperliquid mark may not converge to where the S&P actually opens Monday, and Moonwell positions get either incorrectly liquidated or under-liquidated for the duration of the dislocation.

I’d want Chronicle and Centrifuge to specifically address:

• How the oracle behaves during US market closures (weekends, holidays)
• What happens if Hyperliquid liquidity thins materially or the mark dislocates from where the S&P will print at Monday open
• Whether there’s a staleness fallback if Hyperliquid feeds become unreliable
• Any recommendation on whether borrow operations should be paused during specific windows

3. We have a live reference market; let’s use it as a cap-raise gate.

The same Chronicle oracle is already in production on a deSPXA/USDC isolated market on Morpho with supply from Steakhouse. That’s the most relevant comparable we have, running with real capital on the same pricing infrastructure we’re proposing to inherit.

Rather than treating that as background context, I’d want it to be an explicit precondition: any cap raise on Moonwell should require N days of clean operation on the Morpho market; no liquidation pathologies, no oracle deviation events, no pause incidents, observed behavior through at least one full weekend including Sunday open. That ties our cap progression to observed real-money behavior rather than just liquidity proxies, and gives us a meaningful early-warning system on the oracle before scaling.

4. Concrete unlock thresholds for cap raises.

Anthias’s effectively-zero-caps approach is correct given current liquidity. To make the Cap Guardian path actionable, I’d push for explicit, pre-agreed thresholds rather than discretionary judgment later. Suggested:

• $500K swap clears at <10% slippage on Aerodrome → first cap raise eligible
• $2M sustained Aerodrome TVL for 14+ consecutive days → meaningful supply cap
• Defined borrow cap progression tied to supply utilization on the Morpho reference market

This turns a binary “ready/not ready” debate into a measurable trigger and protects the protocol from caps being raised on the basis of vibes once attention shifts.

5. LayerZero DVN upgrade timeline.

The proposal references a planned 2/2 → 4/4 DVN upgrade as “soon.” What’s the actual timeline, and can we get a commitment that meaningful supply caps won’t be raised until 4/4 is live? Listing under 2/2 is fine for a zero-cap initialization, but I’d want the upgrade in place before any real value sits in this market.

Net: support initialization with zero-equivalent caps and the Chronicle oracle. The conditions for cap raises should be quantitative, the liquidity discrepancy should be reconciled in the proposal text, the oracle’s behavior during S&P market closures should be documented, and the Morpho reference market should be a formal input to cap-raise decisions before this goes to a full vote.