MIP-50 Artemis Risk Parameter Recs (2023-05-15)

Artemis Summary

We recommend the following risk parameter changes:

  • Increase the xcUSDT collateral factor from 50.0% to 53.0%.
  • Increase the USDC.wh collateral factor from 62.0% to 64.0%.
  • Increase USDC.wh borrow cap from 2,100,000 to 2,600,000.
  • Increase FRAX borrow cap from 5,000,000 to 5,250,000.

Rationale:

VaR is $0 and our recommendations will leave it unchanged. Our recommendations will increase LaR from $302k to $303k. xcUSDT and USDC.wh are relatively safe from a market risk perspective, so we can gradually increased their collateral factor to improve capital efficiency. WETH.wh, WGLMR, WBTC.wh, FRAX, and xcDOT’s collateral factors are effectively balancing risk and capital efficiency.

With no recent improvement in liquidity for ETH.wh, we do not currently recommend to increase borrow cap for this asset, even though borrow cap usage is at 97%. As for USDC.wh and FRAX, we recommend to increase borrow caps based on current market liquidity and underlying user positions.

As we make recommendations through our risk models, we keep a constant check on the market liquidity and concentration risk to the Artemis protocol. In this regard, we would like to present some key liquidity figures for Artemis assets to share with the community. Since our last post, liquidity has improved for stablecoins while non-stablecoins have experienced some gradual decline in market depth.

Asset Concentration Risk Total Circulating Supply Current 25% Depth Current 25% Depth USD 25% Depth on April 12th
ETH.wh 89% 1,860.78 80 $143,602 110
USDC.wh 46% 4,566,251.00 1,500,000 $1,500,000 800,000
WBTC.wh 90% 139.94 6 $148,838 8
xcUSDT 16% 1,864,992.00 1,300,000 $1,300,000 950,000
xcDOT 16% 2,539,465.31 26,000 $137,800 53,000
FRAX 20% 5,319,872.00 1,300,000 $1,300,000 950,000

Methodology

This set of parameter updates seeks to maintain the overall risk tolerance of the protocol while making risk trade-offs between specific assets.

Gauntlet’s parameter recommendations are driven by an optimization function that balances 3 core metrics: insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage. Parameter recommendations seek to optimize for this objective function. Our agent-based simulations use a wide array of varied input data that changes on a daily basis (including but not limited to asset volatility, asset correlation, asset collateral usage, DEX / CEX liquidity, trading volume, expected market impact of trades, and liquidator behavior). Gauntlet’s simulations tease out complex relationships between these inputs that cannot be simply expressed as heuristics. As such, the input metrics we show below can help understand why some of the param recs have been made but should not be taken as the only reason for recommendation. To learn more about our methodologies, please see the Helpful Links section at the bottom.

Supporting Data

The below figures show trends on key market statistics regarding borrows and utilization that we will continue to monitor:

Top 10 Borrowers’ Aggregate Positions & Borrow Usages

Top 10 Borrowers’ Entire Supply

Top 10 Borrowers’ Entire Borrows

Link to chart

Risk Dashboard

The community should use Gauntlet’s Artemis Risk Dashboard to better understand the updated parameter suggestions and general market risk in Artemis.

Value at Risk represents the 95th percentile insolvency value that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event.

Liquidations at Risk represents the 95th percentile liquidation volume that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event.

Quick Links

Please click below to learn about our methodologies:

Gauntlet Parameter Recommendation Methodology
Gauntlet Model Methodology

By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos.

Next Steps

This will be put up for an on-chain vote by May 16th.

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Summary

Our analysis supports Gauntlet’s proposal to:

  • Increase the xcUSDT collateral factor from 50.0% to 53.0%.
  • Increase the USDC.wh collateral factor from 62.0% to 64.0%.
  • Increase USDC.wh borrow cap from 2,100,000 to 2,600,000.
  • Increase FRAX borrow cap from 5,000,000 to 5,250,000.

Our tests also indicate that the proposed parameters do not significantly increase the overall risk exposure profile of the protocol. Therefore, we support Gauntlet’s proposal.

As part of our analysis we also highlighted potential improvements that could be made by Gauntlet in subsequent proposals:

  • Artemis
    • GLMR - Reduce borrow cap from 15,000,000 to 8,000,000 to match demand more closely.
    • USDT, FRAX - Increase the stablecoin interest model kink interest rate to maximize supply yields and reserve fees.
  • Apollo
    • MOVR, xcKSM, ETH - Decrease kink interest rates to increase utilization.
    • MOVR - Reduce borrow cap from 335,000 to 150,000 to match demand more closely.
    • xcKSM - Reduce borrow cap from 32,000 to 12,500 to match demand more closely.

Governance Parameter Review

As described in our methodology, using customized risk analysis tools we’ll analyze the impacts of the proposed parameter changes.

Increase collateral factors for USDT.multi and USDC.wh

Proposed changes

  • Increase the USDT.multi collateral factor from 50.0% to 53.0%.
  • Increase the USDC.wh collateral factor from 62.0% to 64.0%.

Robustness tests

Case Details Results
5.1 Worst case historical liquidation scenario can be executed profitably in under 60 min for all markets. For every market, validate that the worst time to liquidation is lower than 60 min by running a liquidation backtesting simulation.

Liquidation backtesting input parameters:

  • Protocol: Moonwell Artemis or Moonwell Apollo
  • Asset: Underlying asset of concerned market
  • Period: Largest time period where market conditions are comparable to current. (i.e pre-shanghai historical data for LSD assets might not be relevant)
  • Liquidation size: $200k
  • Conditional price change: Optional - Useful to scope down liquidation cost statistics to relevant downturn events and make simulation faster to run. Suggested: -5% for volatile assets, -0.05% for stablecoins
  • Liquidation discount: Current or proposed liquidation discount.
Liquidation incentives for both markets have been sufficient to profitably liquidate a $200k position in under 3min 15s during the last 90 days.

Pass

Liquidation backtesting results

🟢 3min15s worst time to liquidation

6.1 The collateral factor gives the protocol sufficient room to wait for 60 min to execute a liquidations profitably without incurring bad debts even if the collateral assets decrease by the max drawdown For every concerned market, validate that (1 - collateral factor) covers the sum of following values at minimum:
  • Max drawdown 60min
  • Liquidation incentive
USDC.wh: Pass

Collateral factor has sufficient margin to cover volatility and liquidation incentive.

Collateral factor: 0.64

Max drawdown 1h (last year) = 5.32% (link)

Artemis liquidation incentive = 10%

🟢 Safety margin = 20.68%


USDT.multi: Pass

Collateral factor has sufficient margin to cover volatility and liquidation incentive.

Collateral factor: 0.53

Max drawdown 1h (last year) = 1.08% (link)

Artemis liquidation incentive = 10%

🟢 Safety margin = 35.92%

6.2 Parameter change doesn’t make any account liquidatable Validate no account is liquidatable by running a collateral at risk simulation with following inputs:
  • Proposed collateral ratio for all markets.
  • Small asset prices decrease (-2%) across all collateral assets.

    Run another simulation:

    • Proposed collateral ratio for all markets.
    • Small asset prices increase (+2%) across all debt assets.
N/A

Collateral factor increase has no impact.

6.3 Parameter change doesn’t make any account liquidatable (on-chain) On a local network fork, get the current liquidity for all accounts, then run the following simulation to evaluate system state after proposal is applied:

Simulation #1

  • Apply proposed parameter changes
  • Force a small decrease in oracle prices for concerned markets

    Simulation #2

    • Apply proposed parameter changes
    • Force a small increase in oracle prices for concerned markets

      Validate accounts remain liquid in both cases

N/A

Collateral factor increase has no impact.

6.4. Parameter changes do not increase market risk exposure beyond desired level Run Collateral at risk simulations with and without proposed parameter changes for the following scenarios:
  • #1 Collateral assets 5% historical VaR (excl. stables)
  • #2 Borrow assets 5% historical VaR (excl. stables)
  • #3 Stablecoin depeg

    Make sure the risk exposure on the short and long side is within desired risk tolerance level if applicable.

Pass

Overall short exposure for the protocol at 5% historical VaR is identical after applying new collateral factors for USDC.wh and USDT.multi.

#1 5% historical VaR collateral assets:

🟢 Collateral at risk unchanged

#2 5% historical VaR borrow assets:

🟢 Collateral at risk unchanged

#3 Stablecoin depeg

🟢 Collateral at risk unchanged

Comments

The proposed increase of USDC and USDT collateral factors by Gauntlet is unlikely to increase the overall risk profile of the protocol. USDC and USDT are currently sufficiently liquid on Moonbeam to be liquidated in a timely manner if necessary. Moreover the current collateral factors still protect the protocol against a significant decrease in stablecoin prices or a large increase in borrowed asset prices. This slight increase in collateral factors will make it more efficient for borrowers to borrow against USDC and USDT.

More information about collateral factor methodology is available in Warden Finance docs.

Increase borrow caps for USDC.wh and FRAX

Proposed changes

  • Increase USDC.wh borrow cap from 2,100,000 to 2,600,000.
  • Increase FRAX borrow cap from 5,000,000 to 5,250,000.
Test Details Results
7.1. Protocol short exposure to underlying assets is manageable For every market, all of the following trades can be executed with under 5% slippage:
  • #1 Buy 20% of market borrow cap from stables
  • #2 Liquidate largest market debt position from stables
  • #3 Liquidate biggest non-recursive debt position
USDC.wh: Pass

5% slippage max ask size:
Stable: $900k (USDT.multi / USDC.wh)
Non-stable: $90k (DOT.multi / USDC.wh)

#1 Buy slippage for 20% of borrow cap (520k):
🟢 0.2% (USDT.multi / USDC.wh pair)

#2 Buy slippage to liquidate largest debt position ($474k USDC.wh):
🟢 0.18% (USDT.multi / USDC.wh pair)

#3: Liquidate to biggest non-recursive debt position ($201.23k USDC.wh)
🟡 Liquidatable in chunks of $90k at 5% slippage (GLMR / USDC.wh)


FRAX: Pass

5% slippage max ask size:
Stable: ~$900k (USDC.wh / FRAX)
Non-stable: ~$90k (DOT.multi / FRAX)

#1 Buy slippage for 20% of borrow cap (1.05M):
🟡 11% (USDC.wh / FRAX)
Could be executed in 2 trades <5% slippage

#2 Buy slippage to liquidate largest debt position ($2.12m):
🟡 Liquidatable in chunks of ~$850k FRAX at 5% slippage (USDC.wh / FRAX)

#3 Buy slippage to biggest non-recursive debt position ($63.29k FRAX)
🟢 Entirely liquidatable <5% slippage (DOT.multi / FRAX)

Comments

By increasing USDC.wh and FRAX borrow caps we allow borrowers to get more borrowing exposure to these assets. We tested that the slippage to sell other collateral assets for these borrow currencies is acceptable. We found that the liquidity for GLMR to USDC is relatively low and could force liquidators to liquidate an account that borrows USDC against GLMR over multiple liquidation transactions. This could slow the liquidation process for specific collateral assets. We think monitoring the liquidity of less liquid collateral assets will be important going forward.

More information about borrow cap methodology is available in Warden Finance docs.

Recommendations and potential improvements

Artemis

  • FRAX and USDT utilization has been higher than the kink (80%) for the past few weeks. If this continues to be the case over time, we suggest considering increasing the kink interest rate from 4.08% to 5%-6% for stablecoins or selected stablecoins. Assuming utilization remains constant, higher kink rates would generate higher supply yields for lenders and higher reserve fees for the protocol.
  • The GLMR borrow cap currently sits at 22,555,000. Users are collectively borrowing 8,000,000 GLMR and have borrowed less than 13,000,000 GLMR over the past 3 months. We think there is potential to lower the GLMR borrow cap to 15,000,000 to keep it more in line with historical demand.

Apollo

  • Utilization for certain non-stablecoin assets has been relatively low for MOVR (27%), xcKSM (20%), and ETH (10%). Low utilization leads to a larger interest rate spread between borrowers and lenders. We think an area of improvement would be to decrease the borrow Kink interest rates from 11.63% to a lower interest rate taking into consideration incentive rewards.
  • The MOVR borrow cap currently sits at 335,000. Users are collectively borrowing 37,000 MOVR and have borrowed less than 125,000 MOVR over the past 3 months. We think there is potential to lower the MOVR borrow cap to 150,000 to keep it more in line with historical demand.
  • The xcKSM borrow cap currently sits at 32,000. Users are collectively borrowing 5,000 xcKSM and have borrowed less than 11,000 xcKSM over the past 3 months. We think there is potential to lower the xcKSM borrow cap to 12,500 to keep it more in line with historical demand.

We support Gauntlet’s proposal of increasing FRAX and USDC borrow caps and USDC and USDT collateral factors.

Risk Monitoring

As part of our bi-weekly parameter review process we also monitored the protocol to identify risky accounts. We focussed on large USDC and FRAX borrowers to identify accounts that are at risk of liquidation. This analysis is also useful in the context of increasing borrow caps for these assets.

USDC.wh Market Overview

Here’s an overview of large USDC.wh borrowers.

Top 5 USDC.wh borrow positions:

Account Net worth USDC.wh positions Strategy / risk level
0xf743...4b140 $563.86k Debt: $474.44k USDC.wh

Collateral: $804.23k USDC.wh

Recursive (very low risk)
0xbfa0...2c9a $164.93k Debt: $201.23k USDC.wh

Collateral: $383.61k GLMR

Cross-currency (high risk)

1.09 health score

0xb554...1dab $301.66k Debt: $199.73k USDC.wh

Collateral: $200k USDC.wh

Recursive with DOT.xc buffer (low risk)
0xea59...26db $246.10k Debt: $165k USDC.wh

Collateral: $25k USDC.wh

Cross-stable recursive (low risk)
0x7780...be10 $2.85M Debt: $124.77k USDC.wh

Collateral:$ 2.11m USDC.wh

Recursive (low risk)

Most large USDC.wh borrowers are executing recursive lending strategies. 0xbfa0…2c9a is taking some cross-currency risk by borrowing USDC against GLMR. By our assessment this is likely the riskiest USDC.wh borrower.

FRAX Market Overview

Here’s an overview of large FRAX borrowers.

Top 5 FRAX borrow positions (excl. accounts with bad debt resulting from Nomad assets):

Account Net worth FRAX positions Strategy
0xe0b2...db4a $1.04M Debt: $2.12m FRAX

Collateral: $0 FRAX

Cross-stable recursive (low risk)
0x9ab7...1d30 $1.15M Debt: $1.11m FRAX

Collateral: $2.26m FRAX

Recursive (very low risk)
0x4af7...f6d7 $1.15M Debt: $606.94k FRAX

Collateral: $1.24M FRAX

Recursive (very low risk)
0x7780...be10 $2.85M Debt: $203.7k FRAX

Collateral: $0 FRAX

Cross-stable recursive (low risk)
0xe2d8...3ceb $117.03k Debt: $63.29k FRAX

Collateral: $150k xcDOT

Cross-currency (medium risk)

1.4 health score

Again most accounts are executing recursive strategies making their level of risk relatively low.

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