MIP 61 Gauntlet Risk Parameter Recs for Artemis 2023-07-11

Simple Summary

A proposal to adjust 4 risk parameters across 2 assets:

Parameter Current Value Recommended Value
xcUSDT Collateral Factor 55% 60%
xcUSDT Borrow Cap 1,300,000 1,400,000
USDC.wh Collateral Factor 64% 66%
USDC.wh Borrow Cap 3,000,000 3,300,000

Rationale:

VaR is $1.4k and our recommendations will leave it unchanged. Our recommendations will increase LaR from $777k to $786k. xcUSDT and USDC.wh are relatively safe from a market risk perspective, so we increased their collateral factor to improve capital efficiency. WETH.wh, WGLMR, WBTC.wh, FRAX, and xcDOT’s collateral factors are effectively balancing risk and capital efficiency.

Based on our risk model, the present collateral usage of xcUSDT and USDC.wh allows for an increase in CF without increasing estimated insolvencies.

USDC.wh and xcUSDT Collateral Usage

For USDC.wh and xcUSDT, we recommend increasing borrow caps based on stable DEX on-chain liquidity, increased demand on the protocol, and users’ recursive positions within these assets.

As we make recommendations through our risk models, we keep a constant check on the market liquidity and concentration risk to the Artemis protocol. In this regard, we would like to present some key liquidity figures for Artemis assets to share with the community. Since our last post, liquidity has increased for non-stablecoins.

Asset Concentration Risk Total Circulating Supply 25% Depth 25% Depth USD 25% Depth on June 8th
ETH.wh 92% 1,822 75 $140,750 55
USDC.wh 21% 3,783,086 1,100,000 $1,100,000 1,250,000
WBTC.wh 96% 183 5 $150,987 4
xcUSDT 20% 1,607,704 1,100,000 $1,100,000 1,500,000
xcDOT 27% 1,285,417 27,000 $137,160 18,000
FRAX 22% 5,319,872 1,100,000 $1,100,000 1,500,000

*Concentration Risk represents the percentage of token supply held by Artemis.

Moonbeam 2% Market Depth for non-Stables

Methodology

This set of parameter updates seeks to maintain the overall risk tolerance of the protocol while making risk trade-offs between specific assets.

Gauntlet’s parameter recommendations are driven by an optimization function that balances 3 core metrics: insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage. Parameter recommendations seek to optimize for this objective function. Our agent-based simulations use a wide array of varied input data that changes on a daily basis (including but not limited to asset volatility, asset correlation, asset collateral usage, DEX / CEX liquidity, trading volume, expected market impact of trades, and liquidator behavior). Gauntlet’s simulations tease out complex relationships between these inputs that cannot be simply expressed as heuristics. As such, the input metrics we show below can help understand why some of the param recs have been made but should not be taken as the only reason for recommendation. To learn more about our methodologies, please see the Helpful Links section at the bottom.

Supporting Data

The below figures show trends on key market statistics regarding borrows and utilization that we will continue to monitor:

Top 10 Borrowers’ Aggregate Positions & Borrow Usages

Top 10 Borrowers’ Entire Supply

Top 10 Borrowers’ Entire Borrows

Utilization Rate of Assets - Timeseries

Link to chart

Borrow Cap Utilization

Risk Dashboard

The community should use Gauntlet’s Artemis Risk Dashboard to better understand the updated parameter suggestions and general market risk in Artemis.

Value at Risk represents the 95th percentile insolvency value that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event.

Liquidations at Risk represents the 95th percentile liquidation volume that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event.

Quick Links

Please click below to learn about our methodologies:

Gauntlet Parameter Recommendation Methodology
Gauntlet Model Methodology

By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos.

Next Steps

This will be put up for an on-chain vote by July 12th.

Review of [MIP 61] Risk Parameter Updates for Artemis (2023-07-12)

Summary

Proposal assessment

We support Gauntlet’s proposal of increasing the collateral factor and borrow caps of both xcUSDT and USDC.wh.

Parameter Current value Recommended value
xcUSDT Collateral Factor 55% 60%
xcUSDT Borrow Cap 1,300,000 1,400,000
USDC.wh Collateral Factor 64% 66%
xcUSDC Borrow Cap 3,000,000 3,300,000

Based on our analysis we think the proposed changes are appropriate and pass our parameter robustness review.

Additional Recommendations

  1. We also recommend updating the IRM for FRAX in order to keep rates in line with comparable markets and decrease utilization to more optimal levels.
Symbol Base rate Multiplier Kink Jump multiplier
FRAX 0 0.05 0.0625 0.8 0.25
  1. We also recommend setting the xcUSDT borrow cap higher than recommended by Gauntlet to accommodate the market’s borrowing demand for xcUSDT.
Symbol Actual Gauntlet recommendation Warden recommendation
xcUSDT 1,300,000 1,400,000 1,600,000

Key Observations

  1. Utilization for FRAX has been constantly over the kink utilization rate (>80%) for the last 90 days.
    image

  2. Onchain liquidity for key assets in the Moonbeam ecosystem has improved over the last 30 days. This is due to a significant increase in liquidity for key DEX pools holding WELL, GLMR, ETH.wh and xcDOT.

  1. Recent onchain liquidity increase for WELL and GLMR is most likely the consequence of very attractive WELL rewards for WELL / GLMR LPs on StellaSwap v2.

Robustness Analysis

Our analysis tests the robustness of all of the following changes proposed by Gauntlet:

Symbol Parameter Current Recommended
xcUSDT Collateral Factor 55% 60%
xcUSDT Borrow Cap 1,300,000 1,400,000
USDC.wh Collateral Factor 64% 66%
USDC.wh Borrow Cap 3,000,000 3,300,000

xcUSDT Collateral Factor Increase

Gauntlet’s recommendation:

Symbol Parameter Current Recommended
xcUSDT Collateral Factor 55% 60%

Test:
The collateral factor gives the protocol sufficient room to wait for 1 hour to execute a liquidations profitably without incurring bad debt even if the asset price decrease by the historical max drawdown

Results: :green_circle: Pass
Suggested collateral factor factor provides 28.92% more buffer than minimal requirement.

Details

Methodology: Validate that (1 - collateral factor) covers the sum of following values at minimum

  • Max drawdown (1h)
  • Liquidation incentive

Results

  • Max drawdown (1h) = -1.08%
  • Liquidation incentive = 10%
  • Required buffer = 11.08%
  • Proposed buffer = (1 - collateral factor) = 40% (2892 bps more than 11.08%)

References
Source: xcUSDT Token Dashboard

xcUSDT volatility


Test:
Parameter change doesn’t make any account liquidatable

Results: :green_circle: N/A
Does not apply to CF increase


Test: Parameter changes do not increase market risk exposure beyond desired level

Results: :green_circle: N/A
Does not apply to CF increase


xcUSDT Borrow Cap Increase

Gauntlet’s recommendation:

Symbol Parameter Current Recommended
xcUSDT Borrow Cap 1,300,000 1,400,000

Test:
Protocol short exposure to underlying assets is manageable

Results: :green_circle: Pass
Debt position of 20% of borrow cap could be theoretically liquidated

Details

Methodology: For every market, all of the following trades can be executed with under 5% slippage

  • #1 Buy 20% of xcUSDT borrow cap from stables
  • #2 Liquidate the largest xcUSDT debt position

Results

Test case #1: Slippage to purchase 20% of xcUSDT borrow cap:

  • 20% of borrow cap = 280,000 xcUSDT
  • :green_circle: Slippage to buy $280k xcUSDT from stables = <1%

Tests case #2: Slippage to liquidate the largest xcUSDT debt position:

  • Largest debt position: $193.8k (0xb554…1dab)
  • :green_circle: Slippage to buy $193.8k xcUSDT from position collateral (xcUSDT) = 0%
  • Note: Account is holding a recursive strategy which doesn’t pose significant liquidity risk as-is. Even supposing a case where the account was holding a collateral position in an uncorrelated currency (i.e GLMR), the position could still be liquidated very quickly.

References
xcUSDT Token Dashboard

Historical TVL for pools holding xcUSDT

Slippage to buy xcUSDT from uncorrelated collateral-tier asset

Slippage to buy xcUSDT from stable asset

Slippage to sell xcUSDT for uncorrelated collateral-tier asset

Slippage to sell xcUSDT for stable asset


USDC.wh Collateral Factor Increase

Gauntlet’s recommendation:

Symbol Parameter Current Recommended
USDC.wh Collateral Factor 64% 66%

Test:
The collateral factor gives the protocol sufficient room to wait for 1 hour to execute a liquidations profitably without incurring bad debts even if the asset price decrease by the historical max drawdown

Results: :green_circle: Pass
Suggested collateral factor provides 17.32% more buffer than minimal requirement

Details

Methodology: Validate that (1 - collateral factor) covers the sum of following values at minimum

  • Max drawdown (1h)
  • Liquidation incentive

Results

  • Max drawdown (1h) = -5.32%
  • Liquidation incentive = 10%
  • Required buffer = 15.32%
  • Proposed buffer = (1 - collateral factor) = 34%

References
Source: USDC.wh Token Dashboard

USDC.wh volatility


Test:
Parameter change doesn’t make any account liquidatable

Results: :green_circle: N/A
Does not apply to CF increase

Test:
Parameter changes do not increase market risk exposure beyond desired level

Results: :green_circle: N/A
Does not apply to CF increase

USDC.wh Borrow Cap Increase

Gauntlet’s recommendation:

Symbol Parameter Current Recommended
USDC.wh Borrow Cap 3,000,000 3,300,000

Test:
Protocol short exposure to underlying assets is manageable

Results: :green_circle: Pass
Debt position of 20% of borrow cap could be theoretically liquidated

Details

Methodology: For every market, all of the following trades can be executed with under 5% slippage

  • #1 Buy 20% of USDC.wh borrow cap from stables
  • #2 Liquidate the largest USDC.wh debt position

Results
Test case #1 Slippage to purchase 20% of USDC.wh borrow cap:

  • 20% of borrow cap = 755.86k USDC.wh
  • :green_circle: Slippage to buy $755.63k USDC.wh from stables = <1%

Tests case #2 Slippage to liquidate the largest USDC.wh debt position:

  • Largest debt position: 755.86k USDC.wh (0xb554…1dab)
  • :green_circle: Slippage to buy 755.86k USDC.wh from account main collateral (USDC.wh) = 0%
  • :yellow_circle: Slippage to buy 755.86k USDC.wh from other collateral in account (ETH.wh) = 5% in chunks of $63k
  • Note: Account is holding a recursive strategy which doesn’t pose significant liquidity risk as-is. However, supposing a case where the account would get liquidated by seizing its ETH.wh collateral, the liquidation could require a significant amount of time to execute profitably.

References
Source: USDC.wh

Historical TVL for pools holding USDC.wh

Slippage to buy USDC.wh from uncorrelated collateral-tier asset

Slippage to buy USDC.wh from stable asset

Slippage to sell USDC.wh for uncorrelated collateral-tier asset

Slippage to sell USDC.wh for stable asset