[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (6/11/2025)

Introduction

We’ve been closely monitoring the Moonwell Core markets on Base and are pleased to share our monthly parameter recommendations for June.

USDC

In late May and early June, the USDC market experienced a sharp increase in interest rates as utilization surpassed 90%, triggering the jump multiplier and causing rates to spike. Over the past 90 days, a broader trend of rising interest rates has emerged, coinciding with a crypto bull market. During bull markets, borrowing typically becomes more appealing, driving up interest rates. These volatile rate spikes create challenges for borrowers seeking stable and predictable rates. Additionally, over the past month, the borrow rate on Aave Base markets has risen from 4.36% to 5.87%, reflecting the ongoing trend of increasing rates. For this reason, we recommend a slight bump to the multiplier, resulting in a 45 bps increase in borrow rate at kink. With these changes, we hope to align Moonwell’s USDC market with broader market trends, ensuring stable rates for borrowers.

Recommendation

Parameter	Value
Multiplier	0.049 → 0.054

Granularity: 1h (with WELL rewards). Interest rates spiking.

Granularity: 1d (without WELL rewards). Trending upward over past 90d. Period of high interest rates start of June.

USDC Borrow rates on Aave (Base), exhibiting upward trends as well

Previous Interest Rates

Utilization (%)	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0	0	0
90%	4.41%	3.57%
100%	94.41%	84.97%

New Interest Rates

Utilization (%)	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0	0	0
90%	4.86%	3.94%
100%	94.86%	85.37%

Conclusion

We will continue to keep a close eye on Moonwell’s Core markets on Base, and provide recommendations for necessary parameter changes. As always, we welcome feedback from the community.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (7/9/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of July for Core markets on Base, Optimism, Moonbeam, and Moonriver. We also would like to announce that our risk monitoring dashboard is now live, and can be viewed here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameter	Current Value	Recommended Value
cbXRP Collateral Factor	70%	74%
MORPHO Supply Cap	4,000,000 MORPHO	6,000,000 MORPHO

Rationale

cbXRP

When determining the collateral factor, we evaluate two key factors: asset volatility and secondary market liquidity. The 30-day annualized volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns over the past 30 days and annualized, indicates the expected price fluctuation of an asset. Secondary market liquidity shows how much of an asset can be sold profitably given that price movement. These metrics together determine the collateral factor, which sets the buffer between when a position becomes eligible for liquidation and when it risks creating “bad debt,” where the collateral value falls below the loan value. More on our methodology can be found here.
Below is the 30-day annualized volatility for cbETH, cbBTC, and XRP graphed over the last 180 days. For reference, cbBTC and cbETH have collateral factors of 85% and 81% respectively. As can be seen in the graph, XRP’s volatility spiked much higher than cbBTC and cbETH when it rose to elevated levels across the board in March 2025. Currently XRP’s 30d annualized volatility sits in between that of cbETH and cbBTC.

Measuring secondary market liquidity across DEXs on Base, we see that nearly $1M worth of cbXRP can be profitably sold for stables while slippage stays below the liquidation bonus (7%). This represents more than is currently supplied as collateral to the protocol (335,834 cbXRP), and nearly half of current supply caps. Additionally, liquidators can always access liquidity from other venues including CEXs due to cbXRP’s 1:1 redemption mechanism for XRP through Coinbase.

Based on current volatility and secondary market liquidity, we are confident that the protocol can safely increase cbXRP’s collateral factor from 70% to 74% with minimal additional risk of bad debt, unlocking increased capital efficiency for users. cbXRP’s collateral factor could potentially increase further, though our approach is to incrementally adjust the collateral factor as the asset matures on Base.

MORPHO

Morpho’s supply cap utilization has recently surged from ~70% to 100%, triggering a review for a potential increase. This review will consider the current profile of positions supplying Morpho, focusing on the types of assets borrowed (e.g., are they looped?) and the health of these positions. Additionally, we will assess secondary market liquidity to evaluate whether collateral at risk of liquidation could threaten bad debt for the protocol.

Looking at the top positions supplying Morpho to the protocol, we see that the majority comes from one position supplying $2.93M of MORPHO and borrowing ~$800K of USDC. This user alone accounts for nearly 54% of the supply cap. Other top positions are either looped or have high health factors and don’t pose significant risk of liquidation.

Looking at DEX liquidity, we notice that 400K MORPHO can be profitably sold to stables while staying below 7% slippage (liquidator bonus).

The primary trading pool for MORPHO is the WETH/MORPHO pair on Aerodrome, which sees substantial daily volume (~$1M). As a result, any swap causing significant slippage is likely to be quickly arbitraged, restoring pool balance. This enables partial liquidations to gradually reduce protocol debt, even for large positions eligible for liquidation. Combined with a conservative collateral factor of 65%, current liquidity levels and high trading volume in the main pool make it unlikely for such a large position to result in bad debt.

Optimism

Summary

IR Parameters

DAI IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.049	0.054
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

weETH

Supply cap utilization for weETH has reached 100%, prompting review for a raise. Similar to sections above we will look at the landscape of positions supplying weETH as well as DEX liquidity to determine if the supply cap for weETH can be safely raised.

DEX liquidity for weETH on Optimism is limited, with only about 55 weETH (~$150K) able to be swapped to stablecoins while keeping slippage below the liquidator bonus. This suggests that high liquidation volumes could make it challenging for liquidators to profitably sell seized collateral directly on-chain. However, liquidators could potentially access larger liquidity pools by bridging to SwellChain, where weETH DEX liquidity is significantly higher. Such cross-chain liquidations are more complex than standard on-chain flash-loan liquidations and cannot be consistently relied upon. This may change with the introduction of superswaps on Velodrome, which could simplify the process.

The top position supplying weETH on Optimism accounts for nearly 94% of the current supply cap. This position is a recursive position not at risk of liquidation due to supplying and borrowing highly correlated assets.

The largest position supplying weETH far exceeds the other top 8 positions, though all exhibit similar looping patterns. The current state of weETH supply positions, mostly looped, indicates that a sudden weETH price drop is unlikely to cause liquidation volumes that would overwhelm DEX liquidity or make liquidations unprofitable. However, increasing supply caps now could enable users to take large positions (e.g., supplying weETH and borrowing stablecoins) that, if liquidated, might not be profitably resolved due to limited DEX liquidity. Therefore, we do not recommend raising weETH supply caps on Optimism at this time. We will continue to monitor DEX liquidity and the introduction of superswaps between Optimism and SwellChain on Velodrome, which could facilitate safely increasing caps in the future.

DAI

Over the past few weeks, we’ve noticed that DAI utilization has consistently exceeded the 90% kink threshold, triggering a sharp increase in interest rates due to the jump multiplier. These large fluctuations in interest rates are causing instability for borrowers, as borrowing costs become unpredictable and often unsustainable. To bring back stability to interest rates we recommend slightly increasing the multiplier from 0.049 to 0.054 (50bps increase).

Current APYs

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.41%	3.57%
100%	94.41%	84.97%

Projected APYs

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.86%	3.94%
100%	94.86%	85.37%

Moonbeam

We support Gauntlet’s risk-off approach for the Moonbeam Core markets, which involves incrementally lowering collateral factors across all assets. Following the significant reduction in collateral factors last month, we believe further risk-off measures are not immediately necessary. Over the coming weeks, we will assess the optimal strategy for continuing to wind down these markets.

Moonriver

No parameter recommendations for Moonriver at this time.

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard
Anthias Labs X Account

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (8/5/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of August. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
cbXRP Reserve Factor	30%	20%
cbXRP Supply Cap	2M	3M
cbXRP Borrow Cap	500K	1.6M

Cap changes will be implemented via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.049	0.56
Jump Multiplier	9	9

cbXRP IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.45	0.6
Multiplier	0.23	0.134
Jump Multiplier	5	5

USDC

Over the past month, interest rates have been spiking amid a bull market, where borrowing has become increasingly attractive. At the same time, supply has been decreasing as users likely shift their assets to alternative venues offering higher supply rates. Borrowing levels remain nearly constant at the kink point, indicating no shortage of borrowers under the current parameters and suggesting that the true equilibrium rate may exceed what the existing interest rate model can support. As suppliers exit, utilization (previously at kink) rises above the kink where the jump multiplier takes effect causing interest rates to spike. Some borrowers, elastic to these spikes, promptly repay loans to avoid paying high interest rates which brings utilization back below kink. By raising rates at the kink, we aim to attract suppliers by offering more competitive rates while simultaneously stabilizing rates for borrowers. Ideally, utilization should hover slightly below the kink so there’s enough of a buffer where suppliers can smoothly exit without causing rate spikes.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.41%	3.57%
100%	94.41%	85.97%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.04%	4.08%
100%	95.04%	85.54%

cbXRP

cbXRP’s interest rate parameters were set conservatively at launch to encompass a broad range and allow the market to naturally discover an equilibrium. Now, over a month later, borrow interest rates have stabilized between 3% and 7%. With this tighter range now established, we propose amending the curve to allow more efficient utilization of supply. Additionally, the reserve factor was initially set high; we propose reducing it from 30% to 20% to better incentivize suppliers while continuing to allocate a substantial portion of borrower interest toward strengthening reserves.

cbXRP’s adoption on Base thus far has been largely successful. As of August 5th there’s over 11M cbXRP on base with over 14K unique holders. DEX liquidity is also strong, in July we saw 8 days where DEX volume surpassed $2M. Currently, ~600K cbXRP can be sold to USDC on DEXs while slippage stays below the liquidation incentive.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 30%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
45% (kink)	10.35%	3.26%
100%	285.35%	199.74%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 20%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
60% (kink)	8.04%	3.86%
100%	208.04%	166.43%

OP Mainnet

Summary

IR Parameters

USDT0 IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.041	0.049
Jump Multiplier	9	9

DAI IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.054	0.061
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDT0

Over the past 30 days, the USDT0 market has experienced multiple instances where utilization surged past the kink, resulting in significant interest rate spikes. To address this volatility and stabilize rates, we propose increasing the multiplier to elevate the borrow rate at the kink.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	3.69%	2.99%
100%	93.69%	84.32%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.41%	3.57%
100%	94.41%	85.97%

DAI

Similarly, even after the recent small bump to DAI’s multiplier we continue to see spiking interest rates. For this reason, we propose raising the multiplier further to increase the borrow rate at the kink. This adjustment aims to allow for smoother borrow rate discovery beneath 5.5%.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.86%	3.94%
100%	94.86%	85.37%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.49%	4.45%
100%	95.49%	85.94%

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (9/3/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of September. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
weETH Supply Cap	4000	5400
cbXRP Supply Cap	3M	5M
WELL Supply Cap	220M	250M
WELL Borrow Cap	75M	100M

Cap changes will be implemented via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.056	0.061
Jump Multiplier	9	9

weETH

Over the past month weETH supply has been steadily increasing and approaching the supply cap. According to our risk framework, which is based on liquidation probability score(over a 30 day time interval) the estimated Collateral at Risk is about 146.61 weETH ($675k at the rate of $4600). This value is relatively small compared to the market size of weETH as the primary use case of weETH is to loop it with WETH (as can be seen from the attached distribution). If we compare this CaR value to the secondary market liquidity we can observe that the incurred slippage while liquidating complete amount in a single transaction is minimal(<0.5%).

Considering all the given info and the current market dynamics, we propose increasing the supply cap of weETH by 35% to 5400 weETH (from 4000 weETH).

cbXRP

cbXRP is once again approaching its supply cap, since it’s launch in June the cbXRP market as had its supply increase steadily. Currently, supply cap utilization sits at 71%. We propose increasing supply cap from 3M to 5M cbXRP to support further market growth. Collateral-at-risk sits at around 35K cbXRP (~$95k), swapping the full amount to stables incurs negligible slippage. About 600k cbXRP can be swapped to USDC while slippage stays below 5%.

USDC

Just like last month, demand for USDC has been high consistently which led to frequent interest rate spikes despite the IRM parameter changes we proposed last month. At the same time, supply has been decreasing as users likely shift their assets to alternative venues offering higher supply rates. Borrowing remains nearly constant near kink, indicating no shortage of borrowers under the current parameters and suggesting that the true equilibrium rate may exceed what the existing interest rate model can support.

We propose to increase the multiplier value from 0.056 to 0.061 with no additional changes. By raising rates at the kink, we aim to attract suppliers by offering more competitive rates while simultaneously stabilizing rates for borrowers. Ideally, utilization should hover slightly below the kink so there’s enough of a buffer where suppliers can smoothly exit without causing rate spikes.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.04%	4.08%
100%	95.04%	85.54%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.49%	4.45%
100%	95.49%	85.94%

WELL

WELL has shown steady growth in borrows over the past month, with the borrow cap utilization going from about 40% to being just under 70% currently. The supply cap has also hovered consistently around 75%. Currently the collateral at risk stands at 19.3M WELL(~$500k), we compare this to the secondary liquidity and observe that it can be easily liquidated profitably in a single transaction. Hence in accordance to the above analysis, we propose an increment in the caps with supply cap going to 250M from 220M and borrow cap going to 100M from 75M.

OP Mainnet

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
VELO Supply Cap	68M	80M

Cap changes will be implemented via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

USDT IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.049	0.056
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.0435	0.051
Jump Multiplier	9	9

VELO

Over the past month, supply cap utilization for VELO has climbed to 82%, prompting a raise. We propose increase supply cap from 68M to 80M to allow further growth in the market. The 30d CaR is ~7.6M VELO (~$380K), swapping the full amount for USDC in a single transaction yields slippage of 8.8%. Most CaR can be attributed a single position supplying over 21M VELO and borrowing over $500k of USDC, OP, and WETH. This concentration does not pose significant risk to the protocol as multiple transactions would be able to liquidate this position if needed.

USDT

Interest rates for USDT have been spiking over the past month as utilization surges past kink causing the jump multiplier to kick in. We propose increasing the multiplier from 0.049 to 0.056. This change will raise the interest rates for borrowers and suppliers at the kink, which aims to stabilize borrower rates and attract more supply.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.41%	3.57%
100%	94.41%	84.97%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.04%	4.08%
100%	95.04%	85.54%

USDC

Similarly to USDT, we propose increasing the multiplier from 0.0435 to 0.051 to raise borrower interest rates at the kink. This change aims to stabilize rates for borrowers while increasing the incentive for suppliers.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	3.92%	3.17%
100%	93.91%	84.52%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.59%	3.72%
100%	94.59%	85.13%

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (10/1/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of October. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
cbXRP Reserve Factor	20%	15%
EURC Reserve Factor	5%	10%

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.061	0.072
Jump Multiplier	9	9

EURC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.061	0.072
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

cbXRP

When cbXRP debuted as a market on Moonwell, a high reserve factor was set to build reserves, which started at zero. The reserve factor determines the spread between interest paid by borrowers and earned by suppliers. Since cbXRP is primarily used as collateral with minimal borrowing, most reserves actually come from liquidations. In the chart below, steady slopes represent reserves accrued from borrower interest, while sudden spikes indicate reserves from liquidations. Lowering the reserve factor would provide suppliers with a slightly higher incentive while minimally affecting reserve accrual.

USDC

We propose increasing the interest rate multiplier for the USDC market from 0.061 to 0.072. Data shows that USDC utilization has consistently remained near or above 90% throughout September, with borrowers demonstrating a clear willingness to pay rates higher than the current kink rate of 5.49%. The sustained high utilization means there is little to no buffer for suppliers to exit without causing rates to increase. By increasing the multiplier to 0.072, this would raise the borrow rate at the kink to 6.48% APY (99 bps increase). This adjustment aims to allow smoother rate discovery below 6.48% borrow APY, stabilizing interest rates for borrowers.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.49%	4.45%
100%	95.49%	85.94%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.48%	5.25%
100%	96.48%	86.83%

EURC

We propose the same adjustment for the EURC market, increasing the interest rate multiplier from 0.061 to 0.072. Similar to USDC, EURC has experienced periods of elevated utilization where borrowers have shown willingness to pay rates above the current kink rate of 5.49%. Raising the multiplier to 0.072 would increase the borrow rate at the kink to 6.48% APY (99 bps increase).

Additionally, we propose increasing EURC’s reserve factor from 5% to 10%. This change aims to increase the speed at which reserves are accrued. Currently, EURC reserves sit around 20K EURC, 64K short of the reserve target of 84K EURC. A reserve factor of 10% is in line with other stables like USDC.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 5%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.49%	4.69%
100%	95.49%	90.71%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.48%	5.25%
100%	96.48%	86.83%

OP Mainnet

Summary

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.051	0.067
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDT IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.056	0.067
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDT0 IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.049	0.061
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

USDC, USDT, & USDT0

We propose increasing the interest rate multipliers for USDC, USDT, and USDT0 on Optimism for the same reasons outlined above. These stablecoin markets have exhibited similar utilization patterns, with borrowers demonstrating willingness to pay rates above the current kink rate. By raising the multipliers across all three markets, we aim to enable smoother rate discovery while ensuring suppliers have adequate liquidity buffers to exit positions without triggering extreme rate spikes. This adjustment will maintain consistency in our approach to stablecoin interest rate curves on Optimism.

USDC

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.59%	3.72%
100%	94.59%	85.13%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.03%	4.89%
100%	96.03%	86.43%

USDT

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.04%	4.08%
100%	95.04%	85.55%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.03%	4.89%
100%	96.03%	86.43%

USDT0

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.41%	3.57%
100%	94.41%	84.97%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.49%	4.45%
100%	95.49%	85.59%

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[Chidi]

I support the raising of the parameters as it is a measured optimization backed by on-chain data that improve capital efficiency while maintaining protocol safety.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (10/29/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of November. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
MAMO Borrow Cap	12M	3M
tBTC Collateral Factor	85%	84%
LBTC Collateral Factor	85%	84%

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.072	0.08
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

MAMO

We propose decreasing the borrow cap from 12M to 3M, this will set the un-utilized ceiling lower while the market is still small, mitigating scenarios where users are able to over-borrow volatile assets during flash-crashes (such as what happened with VIRTUAL on 10/10).

tBTC & LBTC

As it currently stands, tBTC, LBTC and cbBTC all have the same collateral factor of 85%. While these assets have remained 1:1 with BTC, they do so through different mechanisms and are inherently exposed to different risks and have different levels of on-chain liquidity. To better reflect the risk profiles of these assets we wish to distinguish them by assigning lower collateral factors to LBTC and tBTC (which are less liquid than cbBTC). To avoid unnecessary liquidations of users with recursive positions, we will only decrease the collateral factors by 1% at a time, giving users the necessary time to react.

There are two users with recursive LBTC positions with health factors low enough to possibly be affected by a change in LBTC’s collateral factor

1. 0xd567203a85d3667a4c2dad34b5d32485a49fcc7e
2. 0xd46abef3264119a0f5a424521b521060a8701867

We will show that these user will not get liquidated by this change. As a reminder, health factor is calculated by supply * CF / borrow. Changing collateral factor from 0.85 to 0.85 results in the following health factors:

User Address	Supplied	Borrowed	Health Factor (before change)	Health Factor (after change)
0xd567203a85d3667a4c2dad34b5d32485a49fcc7e	0.2242 LBTC	0.1865 LBTC	1.02	1.0096
0xd46abef3264119a0f5a424521b521060a8701867	0.2041 LBTC	0.1683 LBTC	1.03	1.0185

USDC

USDC interest rates have continued to spike the past month despite raising the multiplier, which suggests borrowers are still willing to pay interest rates that exist on the current curve above the kink. Over the past few months, interest rates for USDC have continued to climb across DeFi, reacting to this we will once again bump the multiplier higher from 0.072 to 0.08. This will increase the borrow rate at the kink from 6.48% to 7.2%, allowing smoother rate discovery below 7.2%.

Source

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.48%	5.25%
100%	96.48%	86.83%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	7.20%	5.83%
100%	97.20%	87.48%

OP Mainnet

IR Parameters

USDT0 IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.061	0.067
Jump Multiplier	9	9

DAI IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.061	0.067
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

USDT0 and DAI

In order to standardize IR curves for stablecoins on OP Mainnet, we propose increasing the multiplier for USDT0 and DAI aligning it with USDC and USDT. This change will increase borrow rates at the kink from 5.49% to 6.03%, allowing for smoother rate discovery over an increased range.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.49%	4.45%
100%	95.49%	85.94%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.03%	4.89%
100%	96.03%	86.43%

Moonbeam

No parameter changes to Moonbeam this month.

Moonriver

On November 10th 2025, Chainlink will deprecate the oracles used by Moonwell for MOVR, FRAX, and xcKSM (source). There are currently no other publicly available price feeds for these assets on Moonriver. Without an oracle, lending operations are impossible, leaving no choice but to fully deprecate these markets. Perhaps these price feeds can be serviced by API3, who currently provides price feeds on Moonbeam. An update will be given in the coming days if a deal can be made here.

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (11/27/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of December. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
AERO Reserve Factor	30%	35%
VIRTUAL Reserve Factor	30%	35%
cbXRP Reserve Factor	15%	35%
tBTC Collateral Factor	84%	82%
tBTC Supply Cap	90	50

IR Parameters

VIRTUAL IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.6	0.7
Multiplier	0.23	0.23
Jump Multiplier	5	5

Rationale

AERO, cbXRP, & VIRTUAL

In light of the incidents on 10/10 and 11/4, which have resulted in substantial bad debt in these markets, we recommend raising the reserve factors in order to increase the rate at which protocol/market reserves are built up.

Additionally, for VIRTUAL, we propose adjusting the interest rate curve to prevent bad debt from accruing excessive interest. Current utilization stands at 61%, which has triggered the jump multiplier and resulted in elevated borrow rates. To mitigate this, we recommend increasing the kink from 60% to 70%. This adjustment will lower the borrow rate at the current utilization level.

We will proceed with this interest rate change unless the recapitalization of the VIRTUAL market using protocol reserves significantly reduces utilization. In this case, the change will be unnecessary and we will omit it from the on-chain proposal.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 30%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
60% (kink)	13.8%	5.8%
100%	213.8%	150%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 35%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
70% (kink)	16.1%	7.3%
100%	166.1%	108%

tBTC

We recommend decreasing the collateral factor and supply cap for tBTC due to its limited liquidity compared to other BTC derivatives. For example, cbBTC and LBTC support swaps of $12M and $4M to USDC respectively before incurring 5% price impact, while tBTC DEX liquidity is much worse, supporting $750K in swaps to USDC before incurring 5% price impact.

Additionally, we recommend lowering the supply cap from 90 to 50, as the current cap of 90 remains largely unused.

OP Mainnet

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
weETH Supply Cap	1,200	10
weETH Borrow Cap	220	3.5

Rationale

weETH

DEX liquidity for weETH on OP Mainnet has decreased significantly; currently, less than 1 weETH can be swapped for USDC with under 5% slippage. Since September, large whales looping weETH (supplying weETH and borrowing WETH) have occupied nearly the entire supply cap. Although DEX liquidity was already limited at that time, these recursive positions were not at risk of liquidation due to the ~100% correlation between the supplied and borrowed assets. Following their exit, the cap remains greatly underutilized.
Given the limited DEX liquidity for weETH and the uncertainty that users will engage in recursive borrowing in the future, we recommend a risk-off approach in this market by substantially reducing both the supply and borrow caps, at least until DEX liquidity improves.

Moonriver

We recommend progressively reducing the collateral factors for assets on Moonriver. The price oracles supporting these markets are being deprecated, and as a result the markets themselves are being sunsetted. Minting and borrowing have already been disabled; users can now only withdraw their collateral or repay their outstanding debt.

To facilitate an orderly wind-down and encourage users to close their positions without unnecessary liquidations, we propose gradually lowering the collateral factors over time. This approach gives borrowers sufficient notice and opportunity to repay voluntarily, while avoiding abrupt forced liquidations wherever possible.

Chainlink is slated to deprecate the Moonriver price feeds on January 1st, 2026. Over the next month the plan is to fully reduce collateral factors to zero. The table below outlines the first reduction, the proposal is currently live and can be viewed here.

Market	Previous CF	New CF
MOVR	60%	50%
xcKSM	59%	50%
FRAX	50%	40%

In following proposals, the planned future CF reductions are as follows:

• 50/40% → 25%
• 25% → 0%

We advise that users with active positions on Moonriver repay loans to avoid liquidation. Below is a table of addresses that may get liquidated due to the proposed CF adjustment.

Newly liquidatable positions (after adjustment): 15

Address	Collateral (USD)	Debt (USD)	HF change
0x6b252eed6c28c076fa22c0f006d1d7161e0705ca	MOVR:$1,979	MOVR:$1,112	1.068→0.890
0x341c0d386f630358e576a3bdfe10d9725867e142	MOVR:$843	MOVR:$487	1.039→0.866
0x016f4eb10196d247ae5eb2c9d6c2562d7db7e61c	XCKSM:$792	XCKSM:$440	1.062→0.900
0x71f9b420a6b03d2fbe2c0d2aea5f4365b0e95774	MOVR:$750	MOVR:$432	1.042→0.868
0x749696fbee9c3b972d62bceb19ed38f9fedc261a	XCKSM:$362, MOVR:$273, FRAX:$7	XCKSM:$208, MOVR:$122	1.154→0.971
0xbcba34246db4f560fc19b9a56111b90f8cadb248	MOVR:$334, FRAX:$260	MOVR:$169, FRAX:$143	1.059→0.869
0xfab783f85269b614ff41c80d8f46aef107ae3a90	MOVR:$515	MOVR:$260	1.188→0.990
0x391d396ebe8f48e17483561d6603066f7d7a0514	MOVR:$414	MOVR:$244	1.018→0.848
0xbd24b957413d1006ee642280e8777eeb7dbb0879	MOVR:$323	MOVR:$188	1.031→0.859
0xb3b535c41800b58fd8d52c3f312524500557e469	MOVR:$129	MOVR:$76	1.018→0.849
0xea4c5bd8fb85130439e01ee3a3f0348edcac0858	MOVR:$97	MOVR:$49	1.188→0.990
0xd1bf5f87c7f04f93e46521988940b5aea30eb7aa	FRAX:$75	FRAX:$35	1.071→0.857
0xa88417d8c893248f2986c369e1bb62b2d9aec4f8	MOVR:$24	MOVR:$14	1.029→0.857
0x5be32da7627570c34da15b3410a15d6723d58306	FRAX:$6	FRAX:$3	1.000→0.800
0x3ddc62dc9901e1f4457ffaf728b934cc3de34105	FRAX:$3, MOVR:$1	FRAX:$2	1.050→0.850

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] - Risk Parameter Recommendations (12/29/2025)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of January. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
wstETH Borrow Cap	4800	1200
cbETH Borrow Cap	6400	1000
WELL Borrow Cap	10M	22M

Cap changes will be implemented via Cap Guardian

wstETH & cbETH

We recommend reducing the borrow caps for wstETH and cbETH. Both of these markets have historically exhibited very low borrow utilization, which suggests there is effectively no organic demand to borrow these assets. Despite this, current borrow caps are still set above the total supplied balances in each market, meaning that in theory 100% of all deposits are borrowable. This unnecessarily increases supplier exposure to tail-risk scenarios (for example, the recent wrsETH oracle mispricing event). In an adverse scenario, a user could borrow the full available supply and immediately dump it on a DEX creating temporary liquidity stress. To mitigate this we propose decreasing caps such that if the full borrow cap were instantly sold on a DEX, the resulting price impact would be limited to ~5%. Given the historically low utilization of these assets, this change will have negligible impact on users while capping the downside potential of tail risk scenarios.

Pictured below: cbETH borrow cap utilization past 90d

Pictured below: wstETH borrow cap utilization past 90d

WELL

Following the events on 10/10/25, when a user was able to exploit discrepancies between Chainlink oracles and DEX prices, we reduced borrow caps for nearly all volatile alts on the protocol. This was because the nature of the exploit involved borrowing volatile assets against high-collateral-factor collateral (e.g., USDC at 88%). We felt that, given the nature of WELL as a low-market-cap alt, something similar could happen, so we disabled borrows. However, we believe there is organic demand to borrow WELL that is currently being stifled, so we wish to increase caps slightly such that they remain mostly utilized, capping the downside of tail-risk scenarios while still allowing natural borrowing behavior in the market.

Pictured below: A swap of 12M WELL to USDC results in ~5% slippage, this is the borrowing capacity being added to the WELL market.

OP Mainnet

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
wstETH Borrow Cap	1500	300
rETH Borrow Cap	340	150
cbETH Supply Cap	10	0.1

Cap changes will be implemented via Cap Guardian

wstETH & rETH

For the same reasons as on Base, we recommend decreasing borrow caps for wstETH and rETH on OP Mainnet. These markets also see very limited organic borrowing activity, yet current caps still allow a meaningful portion of supplied assets to be borrowed. This leaves suppliers unnecessarily exposed in tail-risk scenarios where a large borrow could be dumped on-chain.

Pictured below: rETH borrow cap utilization past 90d

Pictured below: wstETH borrow cap utilization past 90d

cbETH

We recommend effectively zeroing out the supply cap for cbETH given that on-chain DEX liquidity is extremely thin (essentially non-existent). By setting the supply cap to 0.1 (the borrow cap is already 0.1), we effectively pause the market until on-chain liquidity improves.

Pictured below: a swap of 0.1 cbETH to USDC incurs 7% slippage

Moonriver

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
xcKSM	25%	15%
FRAX	25%	15%
MOVR	25%	15%

Chainlink plans to deprecate the oracle feeds on Moonriver on February 1st. Therefore, we recommend continuing to wind down collateral factors in the Moonriver markets to zero before that date. As the next step, we propose decreasing collateral factors from 25% to 15%. This may cause some users to be liquidated, so if you have an active position on Moonriver, please close it to avoid this outcome. Below is a table of addresses that are likely to be affected by this change.

Estimated debt repaid: $5,334.00

Newly liquidatable positions (after adjustment): 80

Address	Collateral (USD)	Debt (USD)	HF change
0x98cea6ed2cf1047b08942cdeed525dc7eae2e84e	XCKSM:$2,696, MOVR:$2,528	XCKSM:$1,171	1.115→0.669
0xea596b95be434da15c2d438011be8d35ca5826db	XCKSM:$3,408, MOVR:$981, FRAX:$715	MOVR:$692, XCKSM:$376	1.195→0.717
0xf57439b647b5d2ba7309b5b58eaadefa69238926	MOVR:$2,300, XCKSM:$1,136	XCKSM:$418, MOVR:$150, FRAX:$24	1.451→0.871
0x50bfa31336524ef6f729ae4d07beb44e1f97ed53	FRAX:$1,026, MOVR:$15	FRAX:$245	1.062→0.637
0x491ffc953e1ab2751817ff90a5f32694a4841474	MOVR:$669, XCKSM:$491	XCKSM:$175	1.657→0.994
0x6b252eed6c28c076fa22c0f006d1d7161e0705ca	MOVR:$735	MOVR:$146	1.259→0.755
0x15fd6f22be98b21ac03e685dac2c38e5de2055b6	XCKSM:$782	XCKSM:$141	1.387→0.832
0x5963c46aeb3f51ced435a770e40958b640480f6c	FRAX:$684	FRAX:$138	1.239→0.743
0xc40b91a2e1182739487638ed377675b74a3c4467	MOVR:$731	FRAX:$133	1.374→0.824
0x2944778ea6a8c8b05780842b44413022b1246895	MOVR:$590	MOVR:$127	1.161→0.697
0x462b7abe217d652e820321b47f80d65437e62160	XCKSM:$281, MOVR:$153	XCKSM:$99, FRAX:$3	1.064→0.638
0x71583c00b62c85601e83b88ffc59233b1243b30d	MOVR:$264, XCKSM:$184	XCKSM:$96	1.167→0.700
0xe1f5a5166df06f575a755ef26238cb4b07c1ce66	MOVR:$518	MOVR:$85	1.524→0.914
0x9f94ff95cbc403cbfc18802edeaef71da8155f36	FRAX:$372, XCKSM:$128, MOVR:$5	XCKSM:$79	1.598→0.959
0xbcba34246db4f560fc19b9a56111b90f8cadb248	MOVR:$148, FRAX:$146	FRAX:$37, MOVR:$32	1.065→0.639
0x749696fbee9c3b972d62bceb19ed38f9fedc261a	XCKSM:$197, MOVR:$91, FRAX:$7	XCKSM:$43, MOVR:$23	1.117→0.670
0xa2ebd97892502847061fe611efd5e289dbfa0703	XCKSM:$269	XCKSM:$66	1.019→0.611
0x62e97d3f157162a5fb1f81a388358909922407e7	MOVR:$304	MOVR:$59	1.288→0.773
0xd56e6809e34a4271aa4d08dc4522266b9f3527fc	MOVR:$235, FRAX:$9	MOVR:$34, FRAX:$20	1.130→0.678
0x71f9b420a6b03d2fbe2c0d2aea5f4365b0e95774	MOVR:$263	MOVR:$49	1.342→0.805
0x57c0674424b354d55ec45c65fad0f0dd3edd92cb	MOVR:$296	XCKSM:$47	1.574→0.945
0x65274e52b12e0cfac2cc42bc4fb971447507c5e2	XCKSM:$117, MOVR:$76	FRAX:$43	1.122→0.673
0x5989190301ef1b771ee0b0290519b27f6fdda08a	MOVR:$99, XCKSM:$94	FRAX:$39	1.237→0.742
0xaa69b502540b8a1b0d05e4df02bae637397d09f3	MOVR:$138	MOVR:$20, XCKSM:$12	1.078→0.647
0x826121d2a47c9d6e71fd4fed082ceccc8a5381b1	XCKSM:$72, MOVR:$65	MOVR:$30	1.142→0.685
0x3ec80aa5aa9563ae4108ad548af38bdf50bca5c4	MOVR:$155	FRAX:$29	1.336→0.802
0x07a92f07b414157f1b51dc6363c4e41483c9ae30	FRAX:$117	FRAX:$26	1.125→0.675
0x6c7e7fbfa69f4b5a5ade1c27bc74fa4290a3b8a3	XCKSM:$137	XCKSM:$25	1.370→0.822
0x0a4e5c29d7c1c80e0d6d3f06d1a28dfd6609536a	MOVR:$132	MOVR:$24	1.375→0.825
0x9bbf8d4eae6d0423fc9b1ae37c934a3a0c574aa3	MOVR:$137	MOVR:$21	1.631→0.979
0x5972da5ff1b91a83fce2cda94ad8601dc0eb14b3	FRAX:$74, MOVR:$7	FRAX:$17, MOVR:$3	1.012→0.608
0x75ef617ebe6bb4e7b4e85c37c25462c1dbdd5b00	XCKSM:$88, MOVR:$12	XCKSM:$19	1.316→0.789
0x5b1419e3b2ab4f55178c14b7d1d5326d9fcb5dec	XCKSM:$115	MOVR:$19	1.513→0.908
0xbd24b957413d1006ee642280e8777eeb7dbb0879	MOVR:$108	MOVR:$18	1.500→0.900
0x9282c491cbf940e66fb95e0ee52a1bdfb0dd4e52	MOVR:$45, XCKSM:$36	XCKSM:$12, MOVR:$6	1.125→0.675
0x157a8c092a9544fb84ed06d633956c1aba075e9f	MOVR:$80, XCKSM:$10	FRAX:$11, XCKSM:$7	1.250→0.750
0x9187ca4c4426eea21a97fa1c415836ff75b06a69	MOVR:$81	MOVR:$17	1.191→0.715
0x82ad076fe3637e851741a4ec48e3f0a427d8672f	MOVR:$80	FRAX:$16	1.250→0.750
0x409ea67dc4f83b8d91a8b32057aed28f5debbd4a	XCKSM:$88	MOVR:$14	1.571→0.943
0xbf2d4f7bcafb6111fcdeaaa6c1fa680d084dc0c1	MOVR:$68	MOVR:$14	1.214→0.729
0x186fed4e49ae0fb6f312ac81d5af0397d31feb8a	MOVR:$67	MOVR:$14	1.196→0.718
0x2f4675d80a50857ea02933f2487ef1fedb6660c1	MOVR:$33, XCKSM:$25	MOVR:$8, XCKSM:$5	1.115→0.669
0xc5ea9eb8cdba62e0a7d89b4fe6a2431afe64133b	MOVR:$49	MOVR:$10	1.225→0.735
0x68541f794a58ce79a21f843745cc73a1d281ee87	XCKSM:$34, MOVR:$6	XCKSM:$10	1.000→0.600
0x2f8a59340e59c51b1df8fb8210f298e8451fbfb9	XCKSM:$40, MOVR:$7	FRAX:$10	1.175→0.705
0x391d396ebe8f48e17483561d6603066f7d7a0514	MOVR:$43	MOVR:$9	1.194→0.717
0x6c7b2911369eb702f4b007633e19f18f75babc73	MOVR:$48	FRAX:$9	1.333→0.800
0xea4c5bd8fb85130439e01ee3a3f0348edcac0858	MOVR:$43	MOVR:$9	1.194→0.717
0xd1bf5f87c7f04f93e46521988940b5aea30eb7aa	FRAX:$47	FRAX:$9	1.306→0.783
0x0aac6fe840d4da1261f275562ae33d67ba6869ee	XCKSM:$34, MOVR:$2	FRAX:$8	1.125→0.675
0xb82c368a482a99674582129a2578ee2ab80d4b18	MOVR:$28	FRAX:$7	1.000→0.600
0x1de88cc3a0fcd2c3077fb4426cc5afef6827820f	MOVR:$28	MOVR:$6	1.167→0.700
0xa5d56b2879eedae9e8a2081b768a2bd70d550c9a	MOVR:$22	MOVR:$5	1.100→0.660
0xd7cc57bfe31c7a9abc7edce68f660329828694ec	MOVR:$23	MOVR:$4	1.438→0.862
0x8c0fcf914e90ff5d7f2d02c1576bf4245fad2b7f	MOVR:$16	MOVR:$4	1.000→0.600
0x6d82b45e9a59fbe228cf2373c6bc50667bb4c40f	MOVR:$21	XCKSM:$4	1.312→0.787
0xa18f887b74a21cccd0d8b5f955315eb6c8d4efab	MOVR:$22	MOVR:$4	1.375→0.825
0xad55df79fc48258e526beca6648b157941320a1c	FRAX:$17	FRAX:$4	1.062→0.637
0xe1500f14598d27da31cddfd0ffb124b0f904bd2c	FRAX:$22	FRAX:$4	1.375→0.825
0x872af3cb1dad88907f2944f166a98a9d4a86dd93	MOVR:$16	FRAX:$4	1.000→0.600
0x716ec07ecce444596d9d16de78f74e58bac4ed9c	MOVR:$15	FRAX:$3	1.250→0.750
0x7ea65c38c2d4ef477dbce3b95bed5ca85a0a4b73	MOVR:$18	MOVR:$3	1.500→0.900
0x96070153d3581a0f946c0785b58c1f7a969a5b4d	XCKSM:$13	FRAX:$3	1.083→0.650
0xb4c9531a60e252c871d51923bc9f153f1d371ca8	FRAX:$13	FRAX:$3	1.083→0.650
0x7f81e7109f5fcf5e44082c8f7999d05642777264	MOVR:$18	MOVR:$3	1.500→0.900
0x8a147a71947f8659dfcb80d6b198e5dd9acc812b	MOVR:$12	MOVR:$2	1.500→0.900
0xbaa0b77700482d2c0c19f804e563c0b62c9934d3	MOVR:$12, XCKSM:$1	FRAX:$2	1.625→0.975
0x7dec7d0bb9f27988c005b0fe6e9fd88b22250f08	MOVR:$10	MOVR:$2	1.250→0.750
0xe8111f6e1dea577136fc223fe1528805a59f1a1c	MOVR:$11	FRAX:$2	1.375→0.825
0x8fb3d60c63634c7640248de71aa225d71a1a0ce8	MOVR:$11	MOVR:$2	1.375→0.825
0x02ff537c4e2995d7ce0be764fea5b9fa5d782cf5	MOVR:$9	MOVR:$2	1.125→0.675
0x0c84c7330ee905977a340ca44525b92c07f5876f	MOVR:$8	MOVR:$2	1.000→0.600
0xf953b83f7ffcfdec76fd5182a6afe069144e2840	MOVR:$5, XCKSM:$1	MOVR:$1	1.500→0.900
0x1f34fb4e5c7015ddabc68bfaf6447696987f34d9	XCKSM:$3, MOVR:$3	XCKSM:$1	1.500→0.900
0x5780742c90bb4607d1adca1bb052f62761e2e340	MOVR:$4	XCKSM:$1	1.000→0.600
0x645c22593c232ae78a7ecbac93b38cbac535ef12	XCKSM:$6	FRAX:$1	1.500→0.900
0x57ffb07825f23829c9c7a5be1e294fd199151eff	MOVR:$6	FRAX:$1	1.500→0.900
0x2e59dd47c415278b890b7f1a2846e0ced3cf080b	XCKSM:$5	XCKSM:$1	1.250→0.750
0xce8453cc4200c37b25fef3c8c90f544d1370e248	XCKSM:$6	FRAX:$1	1.500→0.900
0x4042ac99caa740d7d3aea6d0db06631aa4ad45e1	MOVR:$5	FRAX:$1	1.250→0.750

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendation (1/21/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of February. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
LBTC Collateral Factor	84%	83%
tBTC Collateral Factor	82%	81%
WELL Borrow Cap	22M	34M

Cap changes will be made via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

cbBTC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.7	0.45
Multiplier	0.0615	0.0615
Jump Multiplier	2	2

LBTC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.7	0.45
Multiplier	0.0615	0.0615
Jump Multiplier	2	2

tBTC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.7	0.45
Multiplier	0.0615	0.0615
Jump Multiplier	2	2

Rationale

cbBTC, LBTC & tBTC

The recommendation for a lower collateral factor for LBTC and tBTC stems from its distinct risk profile compared to assets like cbBTC. Unlike custodial BTC wrappers, LBTC introduces unique tail risks via Babylon staking, including slashing (currently capped/low-probability but non-zero) and depegs due to the unstaking period. tBTC faces unique depeg risk as well. These factors warrant a lower collateral factor compared to cbBTC (85%).

Additionally, we recommend amending the IR curve for cbBTC, LBTC, and tBTC. Over the past 90 days both has experience low utilization (<18% for cbBTC, <25% for LBTC, and <28% for tBTC). The current IR curve allows for smooth rate discovery under 70% utilization before rates spike. Since most of this range us not used we recommend a lower kink of 45%. Put simply, the protocol takes on unnecessary liquidity risk when it permits high utilization in under-utilized markets.

Pictured below: cbBTC utilization past 90d

Pictured below: LBTC utilization past 90d

Pictured below: tBTC utilization past 90d

Pictured below: Proposed IR curve for cbBTC, LBTC & tBTC

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
70% (kink)	4.31%	2.71%
100%	64.31%	57.87%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
45% (kink)	2.77%	1.12%
100%	112.77%	101.49%

WELL

WELL currently sits at 100% borrow cap utilization. We propose increasing the borrow cap by 12M WELL, an amount that whose DEX swap price impact is below ~5%.

Pictured below: WELL borrow cap utilization past 30d

OP Mainnet

Summary

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.067	0.0615
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDT IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.067	0.0615
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDT0 IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.067	0.0615
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

USDC, USDT, & USDT0

USDC, USDT, and USDT0 have experience lower-than-usual utilization over the past 30d. This signals a change in borrower behavior. Lower borrowing demand coincides with lower interest rates. To improve capital efficiency, we recommend amending the interest rate curves by reducing the multiplier. This flattens the curve from 0–90% utilization and lowers the borrow rate at the kink (90%), enabling the protocol to lend out more liquidity at more competitive rates

Pictured below: USDC utilization past 30d

Pictured below: USDT utilization past 30d

Pictured below: USDT0 utilization past 30d

Pictured below: Proposed IR curve for USDC, USDT, & USDT0

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.03%	4.88%
100%	96.03%	86.43%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.53%	4.48%
100%	95.53%	85.89%

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendation (2/19/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of March. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
LBTC Collateral Factor	83%	82%
cbBTC Borrow Cap	640	90
AERO Borrow Cap	25M	7.5M
wstETH Borrow Cap	1200	500
cbETH Reserve Factor	15%	20%

Cap changes will be made via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.08	0.068
Jump Multiplier	9	9

cbETH IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.35	0.45
Multiplier	0.061	0.081
Jump Multiplier	3.5	3

Rationale

USDC

Over the past 30 days, stablecoin interest rates have declined amid the onset of the bear market. Borrow rates have remained below 6%, while utilization has stayed under 75% under the current interest rate model.
We propose reducing the multiplier from 0.08 to 0.068. This adjustment would lower the kink interest rate from 7.2% to 6.12%. The goal is to push utilization closer to the kink point, thereby improving overall capital efficiency.

Pictured below: USDC interest rate and utilization history past 30d

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	7.20%	5.83%
100%	97.20%	87.48%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.12%	4.96%
100%	96.12%	86.51%

LBTC

To further differentiate the distinct risk profile of LBTC from cbBTC (which currently has a collateral factor of 85%), we propose reducing LBTC’s collateral factor by 1%. This small adjustment is deliberately conservative and designed to avoid any impact on existing positions. As previously discussed, the rationale for assigning LBTC a modestly lower collateral factor stems from its unique risk characteristics relative to custodial BTC wrappers like cbBTC (e.g., slashing & depeg risk).

cbBTC, AERO, wstETH

We propose modestly lowering the borrow caps for cbBTC, AERO, and wstETH to better protect suppliers during tail-risk events, where large amounts of unutilized supply could be borrowed rapidly and en masse, risking liquidity strain or amplified downside. Borrow caps limit the total amount of an asset that can be borrowed at any time. When set well above current supply, they offer little protection, allowing up to 100% of supplied assets to be borrowed out. By aligning caps closer to existing supply levels, we ensure: normal borrowing activity remains unaffected, exposure to severe tail scenarios (mass borrowing in stress, oracle issues, or exploits) is significantly reduced, and suppliers gain meaningful downside protection tied to current supply levels in these markets.

cbETH

In the wake of a recent incident stemming from a configuration error in the cbETH oracle, we propose adjustments to the interest rate curve to facilitate the repayment of bad debt. With current high cbETH utilization levels (above kink), interest rates have surged to unsustainable levels. The revised curve would lower the rate at full utilization, providing breathing room as funds are assembled to address the bad debt and restore fairness to suppliers impacted by unjust liquidations. Additionally, we suggest elevating the reserve factor to 20%, ensuring that a larger share of the elevated interest accrues to reserves and curbing the risk of compounding debt through runaway interest accumulation.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 15%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
35% (kink)	2.13%	0.64%
100%	229.64%	195.19%

Projected APYs
With reserve factor of 20%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
45% (kink)	3.65%	1.31%
100%	168.64%	134.92%

OP Mainnet

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
VELO Borrow Cap	20M	6M

Cap changes will be made via Cap Guardian

Rationale

VELO

We recommend decreasing the borrow cap from 20M to 6M. The current borrow cap is currently only 9% utilized. With little borrowing demand, this change should have little effect on borrowers while offering more protection for suppliers. This change is necessary due to decreased on-chain liquidity for VEVO, where around $60K or 4M VEVO can be swapped under 7% slippage (liquidation bonus).

Additional Links

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Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[Stevex]

Supplying cbETH for a 47.14% APY in a pool whose funds just went to 0? Not worth the risk, the reserve factor better stay at 15%, raising it to 50% is a terrible idea. There are better and less risky ways to earn a 38.65% APR (47.14% APY).

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendations (3/18/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of April. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
LBTC Collateral Factor	82%	80%
tBTC Collateral Factor	81%	80%

Cap changes will be made via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.068	0.056
Jump Multiplier	9	9

EURC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.072	0.056
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

USDC & EURC

The recent bear market has coincided with a notable decline in the cost of borrowing stablecoins. Over the past month, utilization rates for USDC have remained steady in the 60-70% range, while EURC has hovered around 50%. Given that both markets have consistently experienced borrow rates below 5%, we propose lowering the multiplier and setting the kink borrow rate to 5%. This adjustment is intended to improve capital efficiency in these markets, allowing more funds to be lent out at reduced rates.

Pictured below: USDC interest rates & utilization past 30d

Pictured below: EURC interest rates & utilization past 30d

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

USDC

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.12%	4.96%
100%	96.12%	86.51%

EURC

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	6.48%	5.25%
100%	96.48%	86.83%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.04%	4.08%
100%	95.04%	85.54%

LBTC & tBTC

To further differentiate the distinct risk profiles of LBTC and tBTC from cbBTC (which currently has a collateral factor of 85%), we propose reducing LBTC’s collateral factor by 2% and tBTC’s collateral factor by 1%. This will bring both to 80%. These small adjustments are deliberate to avoid any impact on existing positions. As discussed in previous recommendations, the rationale for assigning LBTC and tBTC lower collateral factors than custodial BTC wrappers like cbBTC stems from their unique risk characteristics (e.g., slashing, depeg, and protocol-specific risks).

OP Mainnet

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
weETH Supply Cap	4	0.1
weETH Borrow Cap	10	0.1

Cap changes will be made via Cap Guardian

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.0615	0.05
Jump Multiplier	9	9

USDT IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.0615	0.05
Jump Multiplier	9	9

Rationale

USDC & USDT

Similarly to the situation on Base, the cost of borrowing stablecoins has declined significantly. To enhance capital efficiency within the stablecoin markets, we propose reducing the multiplier, thereby setting the borrow rate at the kink to approximately 4.5%. Over the past 30 days, borrow rates in both the USDC and USDT markets have consistently remained below 4.5%. This change would allow for more effective use of capital by encouraging higher utilization at lower overall borrowing costs.

Pictured below: USDC interest rates & utilization past 30d

Pictured below: USDT interest rate & utilization past 30d

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.53%	4.48%
100%	95.53%	85.89%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	4.50%	3.65%
100%	95.00%	85.05%

weETH

DEX liquidity for weETH on OP Mainnet has greatly declined. Currently, a swap of 0.1 weETH to USDC incurs around 5% slippage. We recommend taking a risk-off stance by zeroing out the supply and borrow caps in this market until liquidity improves. Without sufficient DEX liquidity, liquidations may become unprofitable, causing liquidators to avoid stepping in and potentially leaving undercollateralized positions.

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendations (4/28/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of May. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
VIRTUAL Reserve Factor	35%	99%
cbETH Reserve Factor	20%	99%
cbXRP Reserve Factor	35%	99%
cbXRP Borrow Cap	1.6M	0.01

IR Parameters

VIRTUAL IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0.01
Kink	0.7	0
Multiplier	0.23	0
Jump Multiplier	5	0

cbXRP IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0.01
Kink	0.6	0
Multiplier	0.134	0
Jump Multiplier	5	0

cbETH IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0.01
Kink	0.45	0
Multiplier	0.081	0
Jump Multiplier	3	0

Rationale

The table below quantifies the ongoing cost of bad debt-bearing markets at their current interest rates. Across the listed markets, bad debt is accruing approximately $19,589 per month in additional interest. This interest does not represent productive revenue from healthy borrowers; it is accruing on balances that will not be repaid. There are two primary ways to reduce this figure: (1) repay bad debt using available reserves, which directly reduces the outstanding toxic balances, or (2) proactively adjust market parameters, which minimizes future interest accrual while the protocol determines the appropriate path for recapitalization.

Last month, some reserves were already utilized to partially repay bad debt across several of the affected markets. This included repayments of 953,335.00 VIRTUAL, 522,946.30 cbXRP, 81,844.16 USDC, and 59.1459 cbETH on behalf of the largest insolvent accounts. These repayments reduced the outstanding bad debt balance and helped limit further interest accrual. However, as shown in the table below, the remaining interest burden is still significant.

	Reserves (tokens)	Bad Debt (tokens)	Borrow Rate Snapshot (APY)	Estimated Monthly Interest on Bad Debt (USD)
cbETH	0.6708	672.3100348	3.58	$ 5,166.56
cbXRP	1949.3515	755714.7424	3.93	$ 3,440.20
VIRTUAL	14171.9282	1251529.239	9.64	$ 6,907.06
WETH	72.8837	241.9081734	0.73	$ 336.25
USDC	60309.2133	389740.0446	4.76	$ 1,545.97
MORPHO	14717.8082	119560.0293	0.92	$ 175.99
wstETH	35.6241	82.04643462	1.59	$ 305.56
AERO	296894.0514	470081.7759	6.24	$ 1,136.66
EURC	24996.822	167033.4598	3.46	$ 563.97
cbBTC	1.774	0.3125244801	0.54	$ 10.81
			Total	$ 19,589.04

cbETH, cbXRP, & VIRTUAL

In the cbETH, cbXRP, and VIRTUAL markets, over 90% of total borrows are bad debt: VIRTUAL stands at 98.9% with 1,251,529.24 bad debt out of 1,264,988.04 borrowed, cbXRP at 92.1% with 755,714.74 bad debt out of 820,388.47 borrowed, and cbETH at 96.6% with 672.31 bad debt out of 696.33 borrowed. At these levels, the markets are no longer functioning as productive lending markets. Instead, most of the outstanding debt is unrecoverable, meaning the protocol is continuing to accrue interest on balances that will never be repaid.

Bad debt distorts the market’s accounting and creates misleading supplier incentives. In a healthy market, borrower interest accrues to suppliers and reserves because borrowers are expected to repay. In these markets, however, most of the interest is accruing on toxic positions. As a result, suppliers may see inflated APYs that are not supported by actual recoverable cash flows. The protocol is effectively accruing an IOU to suppliers based on interest from debt that cannot be collected, increasing the amount that would need to be covered when the market is eventually recapitalized and making the accounting harder to reconcile over time.

To ease the interest burden on this debt and stop the protocol from bleeding losses by owing suppliers interest on unrecoverable positions, we recommend the following adjustments:

Parameter	Recommendation	Rationale
Borrow cap	0.01	Disables new borrowing.
Base rate	1%	Flattens the interest rate curve and slows the growth of bad debt.
Reserve factor	99%	Redirects nearly all interest accrual into protocol reserves.

These changes will effectively reduce the monthly interest burden in the cbETH, cbXRP, and VIRTUAL markets to near zero by lowering borrower rates to 1% and directing nearly all residual interest to protocol reserves. For the remaining markets, the bad debt interest burden can be further reduced by using available reserves to repay toxic balances directly.

Moonbeam

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
GLMR Reserve Factor	50%	99%

IR Parameters

GLMR IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0.01
Kink	0.6	0
Multiplier	0.15	0
Jump Multiplier	3	0

Rationale

GLMR

For the same reason as cbETH, cbXRP, and VIRTUAL on Base, we wish to stop the interest on GLMR bad debt. Currently 96% of all borrows are bad debt. We recommend taking the same actions: flattening the IR curve, setting reserve factor to 99%.

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[Stevex]

As a liquidity supplier of GLMR for this market I want to share the rationale of some of us in this market.

Some of us with big stacks integrated this market into our strategy and wanted to help to ease the debt. Before the pump when GLMR was less than $0.012 the APY was around 100-120% sometimes going as low as 90%. When GLMR pumped many of us suppliers left and sold GLMR. Our plan was to return to the market with more GLMR to lower even more the bad debt when GLMR went down again in price so we could reinforce this market.

I have been analyzing this market long enough and I have seen after a pump whales leave and return when the price comes down again. In the long term this helps to bring liquidity to the market and I as one of them was my idea to contribute like that, when price went down compared to other cryptos swap back to GLMR and supply liquidity to the GLMR market.

But now it seems you give this market for dead so there is nothing else to do other than withdraw the liquidity and move on. If things had been kept the same, when GLMR dumped again you would see whales returning and supplying more liquidity and APY getting lowered to 70% or so.

As an external analyst you can’t see this, only someone that participated in this market knows that that is why many other whales stayed but now it seems they will get screwed. So sad to see.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendations (5/19/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of June. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
wrsETH Collateral Factor	74%	68%

Rationale

wrsETH

As many are now aware, KelpDAO’s rsETH recently experienced a serious incident involving its LayerZero route from Unichain to Ethereum. The route was configured with a 1-of-1 DVN setup, which allowed an attacker to exploit the bridge path and withdraw approximately 116,500 rsETH on Ethereum. The attacker then supplied this rsETH as collateral on Aave and other protocols accepting it across Ethereum and Arbitrum, and borrowed against it.

Moonwell was unaffected by this incident because the protocol had already moved risk-off in the wrsETH market by setting both supply and borrow caps to zero. In light of the incident, we recommend continuing the deprecation of the wrsETH market on Base by gradually reducing the collateral factor until it reaches zero. This approach gives existing users a controlled path to unwind any remaining positions. The first drop (74% to 68%) should not cause any liquidations.

OP Mainnet

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
cbETH Reserve Factor	10%	99%
cbETH Collateral Factor	81%	1%
weETH Supply Cap	1 wei	90 weETH
wrsETH Collateral Factor	74%	68%

IR Parameters

cbETH IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0.01
Kink	0.45	0
Multiplier	0.065	0
Jump Multiplier	3	0

Rationale

cbETH

We have maintained a risk-off stance in the cbETH market on OP Mainnet for some time, with supply and borrow caps set to zero. This is primarily because DEX liquidity remains essentially nonexistent and cannot reliably support flashloan liquidations, which are critical for a healthy lending market. As a final risk-off measure, we recommend flattening the interest rate curve, increasing the reserve factor to 99%, and reducing the collateral factor to 1%. Currently, only negligible dust amounts are supplied and borrowed in the market (approximately 0.15 cbETH), so lowering the collateral factor to 1% will have virtually no practical impact on users. These parameter changes will effectively wind down and deprecate the market for the foreseeable future.

weETH

In mid-April 2026, ether.fi completed the migration of its Cash product from Scroll to OP Mainnet. This move brought over $220 million in TVL, and 300,000 accounts to Optimism, significantly boosting on-chain activity and liquidity. As a result, weETH has benefited from improved DEX liquidity.

We had previously adopted a risk-off stance for weETH on OP Mainnet by setting supply and borrow caps to zero, as DEX liquidity at the time was very thin and could not reliably support flashloan liquidations. However, liquidity has since improved and can now support a lending market with carefully managed caps. We recommend a conservative supply cap of 90 weETH, targeting an amount that results in ~5% slippage when swapping to USDC. We do not support an increase to the borrow cap at this time, weETH should be used as collateral only.

Pictured below: a swap of 90 weETH to USDC results in ~5% slippage.

wrsETH

For the same reasons listed above on the Base deployment, we recommend taking steps to deprecate the wrsETH market by gradually reducing collateral factor to zero. The initial proposed reduction from 74% to 68% may trigger the liquidation of a single remaining user position; however, that position supplies only approximately $10 in collateral and therefore has negligible impact on the overall market.

Address: 0x1fc6356b0d5ac182ba2e753cb49c08832a95dbeb

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendations (6/23/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of July. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
wrsETH Collateral Factor	68%	52%

IR Parameters

USDC IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.9	0.9
Multiplier	0.056	0.06
Jump Multiplier	9	9

MAMO IR Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
Base	0	0
Kink	0.6	0.6
Multiplier	0.45	0.26
Jump Multiplier	5	5

Rationale

USDC

In the past two weeks, utilization in the USDC market has repeatedly approached the 90% kink level, causing borrow rates to spike. This is driven by a notable increase in borrow demand. Borrowed USDC rose from 13.4M on May 22nd to a peak of nearly 14.5M on June 4th. The current interest rate curve supports smooth rate discovery up to a borrow rate of 5.04%. To better handle the elevated demand, we recommend increasing the multiplier from 0.056 to 0.06. This change would raise the borrow rate at the kink to 5.4%. This modest adjustment should improve rate stability and more effectively accommodate the recent influx of borrowers.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.04%	4.08%
100%	95.04%	85.54%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 10%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
90% (kink)	5.4%	4.37%
100%	95.4%	85.86%

wrsETH

Continuing with our recommendation to wind down the wrsETH market, we propose decreasing collateral factor from 68% to 52%. This drop should have little effect on remaining positions supplying wrsETH collateral. As we wind down wrsETH collateral factor we urge users borrowing against wrsETH collateral to repay their borrows in order to avoid liquidation.

MAMO

We recommend adjusting the MAMO IR curve, decreasing the multiplier and therefore interest rates on the shallow part of the curve. This change aims to set the borrow rate at kink to 15.6% and supply rate to 6.6%.

Over the past 90d MAMO borrow rates have mostly hovered between 7% and 13%.

Current APYs

With reserve factor of 30%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
60% (kink)	27%	11.34%
100%	227%	158.9%

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 30%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
60% (kink)	15.6%	6.55%
100%	215.6%	150.92%

Additional Links

Monitoring Dashboard

Anthias Labs X Account

Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.

[AnthiasLabs]

[Anthias Labs] Risk Parameter Recommendations (7/16/26)

Anthias Labs proposes the following parameter changes for the month of August. For more information on current parameters, please refer to our monitoring dashboard here.

Base

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
wrsETH Collateral Factor	52%	46%

Rationale

wrsETH

wrsETH is currently in the process of deprecation. This proposal reduces the collateral factor from 52% to 46%, a decrease that is not expected to trigger liquidations.

OP Mainnet

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
wrsETH Collateral Factor	68%	46%

Rationale

wrsETH

wrsETH is currently in the process of deprecation. This proposal reduces the collateral factor from 68% to 46%, a decrease that is not expected to trigger any meaningful liquidations.

Moonbeam

Summary

Risk Parameters

Parameters	Current Value	Recommended Value
BTC.wh Collateral Factor	6%	0%
ETH.wh Collateral Factor	24%	0%
USD.wh Collateral Factor	9%	0%
FRAX Collateral Factor	21%	0%
GLMR Collateral Factor	37%	0%
xcDOT Collateral Factor	55%	0%
xcUSDC Collateral Factor	25%	0%
xcUSDT Collateral Factor	25%	0%

Rationale

Moonbeam is being deprecated on July 31. Setting collateral factors to zero will make outstanding borrow positions eligible for liquidation. Although this may force liquidations, funds left locked in smart contracts after July 31 may ultimately become unrecoverable, so this change gives liquidators an opportunity to recycle those funds and move them off-chain. The remaining borrowers are likely dormant users or users who have forgotten about their loans. Borrow exposure is low across each market, with total borrows under $10,000, so the overall impact should be limited. However, on-chain liquidity is sparse, which may make flash-loan-based liquidations difficult or uneconomical even after positions become eligible. Still, reducing collateral factors to zero provides the best available path for recovering and migrating funds before deprecation.

Additionally, to address the remaining bad debt on Moonbeam, specifically in the GLMR market, reserves should be withdrawn from the remaining markets, swapped to GLMR, and used to repay bad debt positions. This would provide additional liquidity for GLMR suppliers to exit.

Across all markets excluding GLMR, there are approximately $195,798.13 in reserves that can be withdrawn and used to repay the roughly $120,289 in outstanding bad debt. The final column , reserves minus borrows, represents the theoretical minimum amount of reserves that could be withdrawn, assuming no debt is repaid and all supply is withdrawn before Moonbeam sunsets. In this scenario, a portion of reserves would need to remain in the market to provide liquidity for withdrawals.

Asset	Reserves (USD)	Reserves (tokens)	Liquidity (tokens)	Total Borrows (tokens)	Reserves - Borrows
GLMR	53,384.99	5,338,499.03	0.01	14,529,315.78	-9,190,816.75
xcUSDT	32,006.85	32038.89	66,700.51	9,811.14	22,227.75
xcUSDC	18,458.19	18,458.19	38,478.44	2,662.30	15,795.89
xcDOT	41,691.51	46,897.09	550,562.12	3,302.77	43,594.32
USDC.wh	60,701.98	60,701.98	87,813.17	5,901.55	54,800.43
FRAX	531.37	536.74	37,462.41	63.33	473.41
ETH.wh	16,862.57	9.42	24.03	0.83	8.59
BTC.wh	25,545.66	0.4	0.98	0.02	0.38

Ethereum

Summary

We propose launching three new core markets on Ethereum Mainnet: wstETH, weETH, and rETH. At launch, we recommend conservative collateral factors and zero borrow caps, meaning these assets would initially function as collateral-only markets. Below, we outline the proposed listing parameters and key risk considerations.

Our primary concern is the lack of Chainlink exchange-rate oracles for these assets. We do not recommend relying on market-price oracles for LSTs or LRTs, as secondary-market pricing can be volatile during periods of stress. As a result, these listings would require either a custom exchange-rate oracle solution or coordination with Chainlink to develop new exchange-rate feeds.

wstETH

Risk Disclosure

wstETH is the non-rebasing wrapped version of Lido stETH and represents a claim on staked ETH plus accrued staking rewards. Lido is the largest liquid staking protocol by TVL ($14.2B) and has a long operating history.

The primary market risk for wstETH is a temporary depeg during periods of stress, such as mass exits or leveraged unwind events. During periods of elevated withdrawal demand, users may prefer to sell wstETH in secondary markets at a discount rather than wait in the unstaking queue, which can amplify depeg pressure. As a result, listing parameters, including collateral factor, should account for this risk.

Risk Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Collateral Factor	75%
Reserve Factor	15%
Supply Cap	16,000
Borrow Cap	0.1

IR Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Base Rate	0
Multiplier	0.061
Jump Multiplier	3.5
Kink	0.35

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 15%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
35% (kink)	2.13%	0.64%
100%	229.64%	195.19%

Oracle

We recommend using an exchange-rate oracle rather than a market-price oracle for LSTs and LRTs. For wstETH, there is an official Chainlink wstETH/USD calculated feed on Ethereum mainnet.

Oracle	Address	Type
wstETH / USD Calculated	0x164b276057258d81941e97B0a900D4C7B358bCe0	Exchange Rate

This oracle prices wstETH as:

wstETH/USD = ETH/USD price * stETH.getPooledEthByShares(1e18) / 1e18

Where the ETH/USD price is derived from the following Chainlink oracle:

Oracle	Address	Type
ETH / USD	0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419	Market Rate

And getPooledEthByShares() is a function call on the Lido stETH token contract.

Contract	Address	Function	Description
stETH	0xae7ab96520DE3A18E5e111B5EaAb095312D7fE84	getPooledEthByShares()	Returns wstETH → stETH exchange rate

An exchange-rate oracle is preferable to a market-price oracle for wstETH because it avoids reliance on secondary-market liquidity that may be thin, volatile, or temporarily dislocated during periods of stress. However, this design assumes stETH is economically equivalent to ETH and therefore does not directly capture a stETH/ETH or wstETH/ETH market discount. During liquidity stress, elevated withdrawal demand, redemption delays, or leveraged unwind events, this oracle may value wstETH above its realizable market price.

Liquidity

Secondary market liquidity on DEXs is very strong for wstETH. Currently ~16,000 wstETH can be swapped for USDC at ~5% slippage, providing ample liquidity for liquidations to occur profitably.

weETH

Risk Disclosure

weETH is the wrapped, non-rebasing version of ether.fi’s eETH. It represents a claim on ETH deposited into ether.fi, plus accrued staking and restaking rewards. Unlike standard LSTs, weETH introduces additional complexity from restaking, including exposure to EigenLayer and AVS-specific slashing conditions.

The primary risks for weETH are temporary depeg events, liquidity stress during periods of elevated redemptions or leverage unwinds, and slashing or operational risks introduced by restaking. These risks should be reflected in conservative collateral and borrow parameters.

Risk Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Collateral Factor	70%
Reserve Factor	15%
Supply Cap	14,000
Borrow Cap	0.1

IR Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Base Rate	0
Multiplier	0.15
Jump Multiplier	3.5
Kink	0.35

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 15%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
35% (kink)	5.25%	1.56%
100%	232.75%	197.84%

Oracle

We recommend using an exchange-rate oracle rather than a market-price oracle for LSTs and LRTs. There is currently no official Chainlink weETH exchange-rate oracle on Ethereum mainnet.

For weETH, we recommend a custom implementation: combine the Chainlink ETH/USD market-price feed with the weETH/eETH exchange rate returned directly from ether.fi’s weETH contract.

weETH/USD = ETH/USD price * weETH.getRate() / 1e18

An exchange-rate oracle is preferable to a market-price oracle for weETH because it avoids reliance on thin or volatile secondary-market liquidity. However, this design assumes eETH is economically equivalent to ETH and therefore does not directly capture a weETH/eETH or eETH/ETH market discount. During liquidity stress, redemption delays, or slashing events this oracle may value weETH above its realizable market price.

Price Feed

Oracle	Address	Type
ETH/USD	0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419	Market price

Exchange Rate Source

Contract	Address	Function	Description
Wrapped eETH (weETH)	0xCd5fE23C85820F7B72D0926FC9b05b43E359b7ee	getRate()	Returns weETH → eETH exchange rate

Liquidity

Secondary market liquidity on DEXs is also very strong for wstETH. Currently ~14,000 weETH can be swapped for USDC at ~5% slippage, providing ample liquidity for liquidations to occur profitably.

rETH

Risk Disclosure

rETH is Rocket Pool’s liquid staking token and represents a claim on staked ETH plus accrued staking rewards.

The primary market risk for rETH is a temporary depeg during periods of stress, such as mass exits, liquidity shortages, or leveraged unwind events. During periods of elevated withdrawal demand, users may prefer to sell rETH in secondary markets at a discount rather than wait for protocol liquidity, which can amplify depeg pressure. As a result, listing parameters, including collateral factor, should account for this risk.

Risk Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Collateral Factor	75%
Reserve Factor	15%
Supply Cap	4,000
Borrow Cap	0.1

IR Parameters

Parameter	Recommended Value
Base Rate	0
Multiplier	0.061
Jump Multiplier	3.5
Kink	0.35

Projected APYs

With reserve factor of 15%

Utilization	Borrow APY	Supply APY
0%	0%	0%
35% (kink)	2.13%	0.64%
100%	229.64%	195.19%

Oracle

There is currently no official Chainlink rETH exchange-rate oracle on Ethereum mainnet. We propose using a custom solution similar to weETH, where the Chainlink ETH/USD market-price feed is multiplied with the rETH/ETH exchange rate from Rocket Pool’s rETH contract.

rETH/USD = ETH/USD price * rETH.getExchangeRate() / 1e18

Price Feed

Oracle	Address	Type
ETH/USD	0x5f4eC3Df9cbd43714FE2740f5E3616155c5b8419	Market price

Exchange Rate Source

Contract	Address	Function	Description
Rocket Pool ETH (rETH)	0xae78736Cd615f374D3085123A210448E74Fc639	getExchangeRate()	Returns rETH → eETH exchange rate

Liquidity

DEX liquidity for rETH is the weakest among LSTs. Currently ~4,100 weETH can be swapped for USDC before slippage nears the liquidation bonus of 7%.

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Anthias Labs has not been compensated by any third party for any statements made. All opinions and suggestions provided are based solely on our independent analysis and are not influenced by external entities.